Safe Haven Conundrum: The Use of Special Bailments to Keep Pets Out of Violent Households by unknown
Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
[79] 
ARTICLE 
 
SAFE HAVEN CONUNDRUM: THE USE OF SPECIAL 
BAILMENTS TO KEEP PETS OUT OF VIOLENT HOUSEHOLDS 
 
By: Joan MacLeod Heminway* and  
Patricia Graves Lenaghan** 
Introduction....................................................................80 
I. Domestic Violence and Animal Abuse.......................84 
     A. Unfortunate Connections: Linkages Between 
Human and Nonhuman Animal Violence..............84 
          1. The Triad: Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and 
Animal Abuse...................................................86 
          2. A Silent Epidemic: Society Ignores the Link 
Between Human and Nonhuman Violence.......89 
          3. Abusers Manipulate Bonds Between Human and 
Nonhuman Victims..........................................91 
          4. Community Action in Response to Abuse.........95 
     B. No Room at the Inn: Most Domestic Violence 
Shelters Do Not Accept Pets................................100 
     C. Promising New Developments with Undesirable 
Side Effects.........................................................104 
II. Animals, Property, and Rights: Legal Rules Relevant 
to a Resolution of the Safe Haven Conundrum.......107 
 
                                                 
* Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of 
Tennessee College of Law; A.B. 1982, Brown University; J.D. 1985, 
New York University School of Law. I thank Alexandra Ginsburg (J.D., 
The University of Tennessee College of Law 2015) and Fermin De La 
Torre (J.D., The University of Tennessee College of Law 2007) for their 
research, thoughts, and editorial work on this article. More importantly, 
I am forever grateful to my coauthor, Patricia Graves Lenaghan, for her 
partnership in making the article, once just a vision, a published reality. 
** Associate attorney, Peterson White, LLP, Knoxville, Tennessee; B.A. 
2007, The University of Tennessee; J.D. 2010, The University of 
Tennessee College of Law. 
1
et al.: Safe Haven Conundrum
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2017
Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
[80] 
     A. Animals as Property in the Current Legal 
Paradigm.............................................................108 
     B. Changing Perceptions of Animals in the Legal 
Order...................................................................112 
     C. Current Tensions Between the Legal and Social 
Conceptualization of Animals.............................117 
          1. Pets in Criminal Law: Animal Cruelty Statutes 
Within the Framework of Property Rights......118 
          2. Pets in Tort Law: Moving Beyond Fair Market 
Value When a Pet is Harmed or Killed...........121 
          3. Pets in Family Law: Pet Custody Battles.........125 
     D. Bailment and Damages for Conversion of Property 
in a Safe Haven Context......................................127 
III. Special Bailments as a Solution to the Safe Haven 
Conundrum..............................................................133 
     A. A Proposal and its Legal Basis............................133 
     B. Possible Extralegal Concerns with the Proposal..140 
     C. Potential Extralegal Benefits of the Proposal.......145 
Conclusion....................................................................148 
 
Introduction 
 
Family violence1 is a continuing social problem that 
breeds new complexity at every turn. Just as we seem to get 
a modicum of control over the sheltering of at-risk mothers 
and children (among other human victims), we find that 
family pets2—dependent creatures endangered by the same 
                                                 
1 This article uses the terms “family violence” and “domestic violence” 
interchangeably to denote repeated conduct involving abuse, including 
physical and verbal aggression, in a marital, familial, or other or setting 
characterized by cohabitation. 
2 This article addresses protection for a specific subset of nonhuman 
animal dependents—those commonly treated as family members in U.S. 
households. The word “pet” is used in this article instead of the term 
“companion animal” unless the context requires the use of the latter. 
“Companion animal” may be interpreted more narrowly, even if more 
favorably. See, e.g., Kathy Matheson, Pet? Companion animal? Ethicists 
2
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violent behavior that threatens their human caretakers—
often are left unprotected or under-protected by both law and 
society. In most cases, pets are unable to be sheltered with 
human victims of domestic violence due to shelter 
restrictions.3 Although the heroic efforts of Allie Phillips—
through her Sheltering Animals & Families Together (SAF-
T)™ initiative—and others aim to change the bias against 
the communal sheltering of abuse victims and their pets (and 
are enjoying success), 4  many targets of family violence 
cannot find shelter with their pets. Restrictions on the 
sheltering of abuse victims with their pets result in difficult 
choices for human victims who cohabit with pets. Those 
choices potentially affect the well-being of both the humans 
and their pets in leaving (and, in some cases, returning to) 
                                                 
say term matters, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2011), 
https://phys.org/news/2011-05-pet-companion-animal-ethicists-term.html; 
see also infra note 149 and accompanying text (relating to relevant 
statutory definitions). 
3 See, e.g., Nathaniel Fields, The Pet and Women Safety (PAWS) Act will 
save lives, THE HILL (Aug. 11, 2016, 5:11 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/291166-the-pet-and-
women-safety-paws-act-will-save-lives (noting that “[t]he Urban 
Resource Institute’s URIPALS (People and Animals Living Safely) 
program is the only program in New York City and one of the few 
nationally that allows domestic violence survivors to co-shelter (live in 
a domestic violence shelter apartment with their pets).”); Annamarya 
Scaccia, New Bill Would Help Domestic Violence Survivors Find Shelter 
for Their Pets Too, REWIRE (Apr. 14, 2015, 5:31 PM), 
https://rewire.news/article/2015/04/14/new-bill-help-domestic-
violence-survivors-find-shelter-pets/ (“Less than five percent of 
domestic violence shelters nationwide house pets”). 
4 See Sheltering Animals & Families Together™, You Can Do More!, 
http://alliephillips.com/saf-tprogram/ (last visited July 30, 2017).  The 
number of SAF-T shelters (“shelters . . . equipped to accept families of 
domestic violence along with their pets”) is updated regularly and 
continues to grow; over 100 shelters now are listed on the SAF-T 
Shelters website.  See SAF-T Shelters, You Can Do More!, 
http://alliephillips.com/saf-tprogram/saf-t-shelters/ (last visited July 30, 
2017). 
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their violent households. 5  Federal lawmakers have twice 
introduced legislation to help address this issue, but neither 
attempt progressed beyond the committee phase.6 
Animal safe haven programs have stepped up to 
serve some of this unmet need.7 These programs agree to 
take in the cats, dogs, and (in some cases) other pets of 
domestic violence victims who decide to seek refuge in a 
shelter. This solution is not without problems, however. Pets 
are separated from their owners at the very time they may 
need each other most. Moreover, safe havens typically only 
offer temporary care to pets, and the time limits on these 
arrangements may not mesh well with the transitioning of 
victims to new, independent housing situations after their 
shelter stays are over. Finally, a victim may decide to return 
to the abusive household and take the animal with her, 
subjecting the animal, as well as herself, to renewed abuse. 
This article ultimately addresses the last of these 
three identified weaknesses of safe haven programs—which 
we refer to as the safe haven conundrum—and suggests a 
solution rooted in traditional notions of property and contract 
law and consistent with related public policy. In the process 
of doing so, the article panoramically describes the overall 
societal and legal context in which the issue arises. This 
background is important to many social and legal issues 
                                                 
5 See Fields, supra note 3; Scaccia, supra note 3. 
6 See Pet and Women Safety Act of 2015, H.R. 1258, 114th Cong. § 3(a) 
(2015); Pet and Women Safety Act of 2014, H.R. 5267, 113th Cong. § 
3(a) (2014). See generally Pet and Women Safety (PAWS) Act, 
https://awionline.org/content/pet-and-women-safety-paws-act. 
7 See Tara J. Gilbreath, Where's Fido: Pets Are Missing in Domestic 
Violence Shelters and Stalking Laws, 4 J. ANIMAL L. 1, 9–12 (2008). See 
generally Safe Havens Mapping Project for Pets of Domestic Violence 
Victims, https://awionline.org/content/safe-havens-mapping-project-pets-
domestic-violence-victims; The Human Society of the United States, 
Directory of Safe Havens for Animals™ Programs, 
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_neglect/tips/safe 
_havens_directory.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).  
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involving nonhuman animals, not just the protection of 
animals threatened by violent households. 
With the foregoing in mind, this article proceeds in 
additional parts. Part I outlines important connections 
between human and animal violence (known among many 
in the field as “The Link” 8 ) that underlie the 
institutionalization and operation of animal safe haven 
programs. Part II places nonhuman animals—particularly 
pets—in their legal context, underscoring the notion that 
animals continue to be viewed under the law as property, 
albeit an evolving and specially protected form of property. 
The legal conception of pets, as described in Part II, is 
sometimes in tension with related social constructions of the 
human/pet relationship—including human/pet relationships 
that exist in the context of domestic violence. For example, 
when an abuse victim shelters a pet in a safe haven program 
during his or her stay in a domestic violence shelter, property 
ownership conventions must be observed and may collide 
with public policy considerations at several decision-making 
junctures.  
One significant juncture at which this tension 
manifests itself is highlighted and deconstructed in Part III 
of this article. A pet owner who is a sheltered victim of 
family violence may put his or her pet in a safe haven shelter 
and then later decide to return to the abusive household. In 
that event, the victim not only potentially re-victimizes and 
endangers herself but also her animal. Elements of our social 
services system are designed to help and look after human 
victims of domestic violence in making and living through 
this decision; and if a victim is a parent (most commonly a 
                                                 
8 See What is the Link, http://nationallinkcoalition.org/ what-is-the-link/ (last 
visited July 30, 2017) (referring numerous times to “The Link” and 
observing that “[a]nimal abuse, cruelty and neglect are often considered 
isolated incidents wholly separated from other forms of family 
violence. Today, professionals involved with victims of family violence 
are not surprised when they learn that often these acts are linked, and that 
various agencies are working with the same families . . . .”). 
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woman) who leaves and returns to a home with children, 
other elements of our social services system exist to protect 
those children.9 No social services exist, however, to protect 
the pet of a domestic violence victim when the owner 
determines to return the animal to a household in which an 
abuser resides and abuse may recur. Part III of the article 
highlights this issue and suggests that a special form of 
bailment—a conditional bailment—may help to protect 
animals at this critical juncture. This suggestion then is 
described and critiqued. Following Part III, we offer a brief 
conclusion. 
 
I. Domestic Violence and Animal Abuse 
 
A. Unfortunate Connections: Linkages Between 
Human and Nonhuman Animal Violence 
 
 The role of pets in family violence has remained 
relatively unexplored in academic literature. 10  A study 
                                                 
9  See generally Janet E. Findlater & Susan Kelly, Child Protective 
Services and Domestic Violence, 9 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 84 (1999) 
(describing then current and aspirational relationships between child 
protective services and domestic violence protection and prevention).  
Our reference to female victims reminds us to expressly acknowledge 
that women are not the only targets of family violence. Where references 
are made to battered women and female victims of domestic violence, 
we offer them as nonexclusive illustrations of what has historically been 
the majoritarian fact pattern—i.e., abuse by men of their female 
cohabitants. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that victims of 
domestic violence are not homogeneous in sex, gender, age, or other 
characteristics, and their unique attributes may contribute to both the fact 
and impact of their victimization. 
10 See Frank R. Ascione, Battered Women’s Reports of Their Partners’ 
and Their Children’s Cruelty to Animals, 1 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 119, 
121 (1998) [hereinafter Ascione, Women’s Reports] (identifying then 
existing literature on the issue); Sharon L. Nelson, The Connection 
Between Animal Abuse and Family Violence: A Selected Annotated 
Bibliography, 17 ANIMAL L. 369, 377–86 (2011) (listing articles 
showing connections between animal abuse and family violence); Vivek 
6
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol12/iss1/4
Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
[85] 
conducted by the Humane Society of the United States in 
2000 found that 21% of animal cruelty cases were 
intertwined with other family violence.11 “Experts estimate 
that from 48 percent to 71 percent of battered women have 
pets who also have been abused or killed.”12 As a general 
matter, available evidence indicates that “[v]iolence 
exhibited by one family member against another rarely 
involves a single act of abuse against one type of victim.”13  
Moreover, data from existing studies on the 
connection between animal and human abuse should be 
treated with caution. In critiquing his own work and that of 
others in this area, Dr. Frank R. Ascione, a nationally 
recognized expert in the interaction between human and 
animal violence, notes that studies of animal cruelty and 
family violence against women do not “include comparison 
samples of non-battered women or battered women who are 
not currently in shelters.”14 Furthermore, the sample sizes of 
all these studies are inevitably quite small. As a leading 
                                                 
Upadhya, Comment, The Abuse of Animals As a Method of Domestic 
Violence: The Need for Criminalization, 63 EMORY L. J. 1163, 1167 
(2014) (“Although the commission of animal cruelty has long been 
identified as a potential risk factor for subsequent criminality, and as a 
possible indicator of psychological disorders, only in the past three 
decades has scholarship focused on the link between the two forms of 
abuse.” (footnotes omitted)). Of course, humans are also animals. For 
simplicity’s sake, we often refer to nonhuman animals simply as 
“animals” in this article. 
11 HUMANE SOC’Y U.S., THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 
(HSUS) FIRST STRIKE® CAMPAIGN 2000 REPORT OF ANIMAL CRUELTY 
CASES (2001), http://humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/CAMP_FS_2000report.pdf.  
12 Animals & Family Violence, https://awionline.org/content/animals-
family-violence. 
13 Charlotte Lacroix, Another Weapon for Combating Family Violence: 
Prevention of Animal Abuse, 4 ANIMAL L. 1, 4 (1998); see also Clifton 
P. Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend: Pet Abuse and the Role of Companion 
Animals in the Lives of Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
162, 171 (2000) [hereinafter Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend] (“[D]ifferent 
forms of violence often coexist within families”). 
14 Ascione, Women’s Reports, supra note 10, at 125. 
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researcher in the field, Ascione stresses that his own 1998 
study (described below) cannot prove causation but is 
instead “descriptive.”15 Even where links between animal 
and human violence exist, it is far too easy to confuse 
correlation with causation. It is thus impossible to use 
Ascione’s results to extrapolate to a national comparison.16 
However, a number of small-scale studies have reached 
similar results in various areas of the country.17 
In sum, despite the relative paucity of research on the 
links between animal and human violence and the 
shortcomings of the small amount of research that has been 
done, existing studies do provide basic information that 
supports connections between violence to animals and 
humans. These studies are useful to the discussion of our 
ideas about the sheltering of animals exposed to domestic 
violence or a significant risk of future domestic violence. As 
one commentator observed, “[t]he link between abuse 
against animals and abuse against humans is long 
documented both in psychological and sociological studies 
as well as anecdotal reports.” 18  Taken as a whole, these 
studies and reports reveal some disturbing connections and 
trends.   
 
1. The Triad: Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and 
Animal Abuse 
 
In Ascione’s groundbreaking study in 1998, thirty-
eight women at a domestic violence shelter in Utah were 
interviewed by shelter staff concerning their pets.19 Many 
expressed appreciation that someone had finally 
                                                 
15 Id. at 127. 
16 Id. at 126. 
17 Id. 
18 Gilbreath, supra note 7, at 5. 
19 Ascione, Women’s Reports, supra note 10, at 123. 
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acknowledged concern for their pets. 20  Of the 74% who 
owned pets, 71% reported that their abuser had either 
harmed or threatened to harm their pets.21  
Jane Ann Quinlisk’s statewide study of shelters in 
Wisconsin found similar percentages—about 86% of the 
seventy-two respondents owned pets, of whom 68% 
reported that their abusers were also abusive to their 
animals.22 Although there were lower rates of pet ownership 
in Flynn’s study in South Carolina due to the socio-
demographic composition of that state,23 Flynn also found a 
connection between animal abuse and woman battering. 
Forty percent of the 107 respondents owned pets, of whom 
46.5% reported that their abusers harmed or threatened to 
harm their pets.24 
Animal abuse is not merely an indicator of spousal 
abuse; it also has implications in the development of 
children.25 Several studies suggest that children mimic the 
behavior that is modeled by the adults in their lives. Some 
report that children who witness domestic violence are more 
likely to become perpetrators of domestic violence or 
victims of domestic violence, depending on their gender.26 
Similarly, children who witness animal abuse may be more 
likely to abuse animals themselves.27 In Ascione’s study, for 
example, 32% of the victims who had children reported that 
                                                 
20 Id. at 124.  
21 Id. at 125. 
22 Jane Ann Quinlisk, Animal Abuse and Family Violence, in CHILD 
ABUSE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND ANIMAL ABUSE: LINKING THE 
CIRCLES OF COMPASSION FOR PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION 169 
(Frank R. Ascione & Phil Arkow eds., 1999). 
23 Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 170–71. 
24 Id. at 167. 
25 See generally Jared Squires, The Link Between Animal Cruelty and 
Human Violence: Children Caught in the Middle, KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 2, 
6–7 (2000) (collecting “Child-Related Statistics, Facts, and Theories”). 
26 Quinlisk, supra note 22, at 170. 
27Ascione, Woman’s Reports, supra note 10, at 127. 
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their children had also harmed the pets.28 Of those instances, 
the adult batterer had either harmed or threatened to harm 
the animal 71% of the time. 29  In Quinlisk’s Wisconsin 
survey, abuse of the pet by an adult perpetrator occurred in 
the presence of the children 76% of the time.30 Fifty-four 
percent of those respondents stated that their children had 
later copied the behavior on the pet.31 In Flynn’s study, two 
women reported instances where their children abused the 
pet; one believed that her child was mimicking the behavior 
of the adult abuser.32 Some researchers have attempted to 
demonstrate, with mixed and sometimes controversial 
results, that animal abuse during childhood can predict 
future violence against other humans under a “violence 
graduation hypothesis.”33 Other researchers have suggested 
a “deviance generalization hypothesis,” positing that 
“animal abuse is simply one of many forms of antisocial 
behavior that can be expected to arise from childhood on.”34 
Most of these researchers likely agree that animal abuse by 
children is a “serious antisocial behavior”35 that sometimes 
indicates a broader proclivity to violence.36 
 
  
                                                 
28 Id. at 125. 
29 Id. 
30Quinlisk, supra note 22, at 169.  
31 Id. 
32 Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 167. 
33 Arnold Arluke et al., The Relationship of Animal Abuse to Violence 
and other Forms of Antisocial Behavior, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 963, 963–64 (1999). 
34 Id. at 965. 
35 Clifton P. Flynn, Why Family Professionals Can No Longer Ignore 
Violence Toward Animals, 49 FAM. REL. 87, 88 (2000) [hereinafter 
Flynn, Family Professionals]. 
36 Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law’s 
Role in Prevention, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2001). 
10
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol12/iss1/4
Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1 
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
[89] 
2. A Silent Epidemic: Society Ignores the Link 
Between Human and Nonhuman Violence 
 
 These studies strongly suggest a correlation between 
domestic violence, childhood violence, and animal abuse. 
For a multitude of reasons, however, society tends to 
discount or disregard batterer threats against pets. Pets are 
valued less than humans in weighing societal concerns, so 
that any violence against pets meets with less shock than 
violence against human victims.37 Furthermore, a misguided 
belief that animal abuse is rare has become entrenched and 
exists alongside the assumption that “crimes against animals 
are . . . isolated incidents,” not part of a larger pattern of 
violent activity. 38  As a society, we have not yet fully 
appreciated the integral role that pet abuse plays in the cycle 
of human violence.39  
To a limited extent, connections between human and 
animal social welfare movements are beginning to be 
acknowledged in the United States through newly 
established institutions, including (at least in East 
Tennessee) Family Justice Centers. 40  A Family Justice 
                                                 
37 Flynn, Family Professionals, supra note 35, at 87. 
38 Id. 
39 Catherine A. Faver & Elizabeth B. Strand, Domestic Violence and 
Animal Cruelty: Untangling the Web of Abuse, 39 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 
237, 240 (2003). 
40  See id. at 239; Family Crisis Unit, http://knoxsheriff.org/ 
family/index.php (last visited July 30, 2017) (“The Family Justice Center 
is the hub of more than 60 partnering agencies working together to 
provide assistance and education pertaining to domestic violence, child 
abuse, elder abuse, animal abuse and cyber investigations.”). Recent 
institutions that acknowledge connections between human and 
nonhuman violence may be conceptualized as a modern reimagining of 
social movements from the nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth 
century, the private movement to protect abused children was 
intertwined with the animal welfare movement; private societies would 
simultaneously handle both human and nonhuman service needs. Id. In 
the early twentieth century, however, this common service system split 
11
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Center is “the co-location of a multi-disciplinary team of 
professionals who work together, under one roof, to provide 
coordinated services to victims of family violence,” 
including allowing the victims to “talk to an advocate, plan 
for their safety, interview with a police officer, meet with a 
prosecutor, receive medical assistance, receive information 
related to shelter, and receive help with transportation.”41 
Family Justice Centers are a relatively new phenomenon, 
based on the San Diego model. 42  The growth in Family 
Justice Centers over the past fifteen years was fueled by a 
$20 million funding initiative announced by President 
George W. Bush in October 2003; the Knoxville, Tennessee 
Family Justice Center was seed-funded with a grant from the 
United States Department of Justice through the President’s 
Family Justice Center Initiative and included an animal 
abuse component (supported by the work of the Animal 
Abuse Task Force of the Community Coalition on Family 
Violence) at its initiation.43  There are currently more than 
                                                 
apart when the government took over the management of child protective 
services. Id. Although government intervention in child welfare was 
certainly laudable, it also divorced concern for human welfare from that 
of nonhuman animal welfare. See Allie Phillips, The Dynamics between 
Animal Abuse, Domestic Violence, and Child Abuse: How Pets Can Help 
Abused Children, 38 PROSECUTOR 22, 22–23 (2004). 
41 Tennessee Department of Finance & Administration, Family Justice 
Centers, https://www.tn.gov/finance/article/fa-ocjp-fjc (last updated 
April 13, 2016).   
42 Id. 
43 See Meg Townsend et al., Evaluability Assessment of the President’s 
Family Justice Center Initiative (September 30, 2005), at 55–56, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212278.pdf. Professor Heminway 
was involved in the funding application process, which was supported 
by The University of Tennessee College of Law. We both reside in 
Knoxville and are licensed to practice in Tennessee. Moreover, our 
experience with the matters addressed in this article arises out of pro 
bono and public service work done in Tennessee. Accordingly, we have 
written this article using primarily Tennessee examples and law. We also 
have inserted references to other examples and laws, however, as 
relevant or desired. 
12
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seventy operational Family Justice Centers in the United 
States; Family Justice Centers also exist in five foreign 
countries. 44  A number of these centers, like Knoxville’s, 
opened with financial support from the U.S. Department of 
Justice. By linking public and private advocates across the 
spectrum of human and animal violence initiatives, Family 
Justice Centers hold promise to bind social welfare groups 
in a powerful way. 
 
3. Abusers Manipulate Bonds Between Human and 
Nonhuman Victims 
 
Academic studies of pets and family violence do not 
merely describe a link between domestic violence and 
animal abuse. They also help to explain, in a more 
comprehensive way, why domestic violence exists. Animal 
abuse was previously a missing link in the family violence 
puzzle. The key to the link between animal abuse and 
domestic violence is that animals are part of the “intimate 
home environments of human beings.”45 
 A 1983 study showed that people regard their pets as 
beloved family members. 46  In that study, 87% of 
respondents considered pets to be family members, and 79% 
celebrated their pets’ birthdays.47 In a 1995 study by the 
American Animal Hospital Association, 70% of respondents 
who had owned a pet indicated that they thought of those 
                                                 
44  For a list of centers with web links, see 
http://www.familyjusticecenter.org/affiliated-centers/family-justice-
centers/ (last visited March 26, 2017).  
45 Faver & Strand, supra note 39, at 238. 
46 Id. at 240. 
47 Dianna J. Gentry, Including Companion Animals in Protective Orders: 
Curtailing the Reach of Domestic Violence, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
97, 102 (2001). 
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pets as children.48 Today, more people have pets than have 
children.49  Humans tend to view their animals as “social 
actors who are capable of interacting symbolically.” 50  In 
2016, pet owners spent an estimated $62.75 billion dollars 
on their pets. 51  U.S. veterinary expenses tripled between 
1991 and 2001, an early indicator of the increasing value 
placed on pets.52   
Given this evidence of a strong human-pet bond, it is 
no surprise that it extends to subjects of family violence. In 
one study, Flynn conducted interviews with ten battered 
women at a shelter in South Carolina who owned pets.53 The 
women described their pets as family members, including 
two respondents who brought photos of their pets with them 
to the interview, behaving like “proud parents.” 54  Three 
women even referred to their pets as “children.”55  
 Although this bond is touching, it has sinister 
implications when recognized by an abuser. A pet’s status as 
a family member makes the pet vulnerable to abuse.56 The 
connection between animal abuse and other forms of 
domestic violence is not simply a sign of a general violent 
disposition on the part of the abuser, however. Instead, this 
                                                 
48  Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of “Non-
Economic” Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion 
Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 ANIMAL L. 45, 59 (2001). 
49 Clifton P. Flynn, Battered Women and Their Animal Companions: 
Symbolic Interaction Between Human and Nonhuman Animals, 8 
SOCIETY & ANIMALS 99, 101 (2000) [hereinafter Flynn, Symbolic 
Interaction]. 
50 Id. 
51 Pet Industry Market Size & Ownership Statistics, 
http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp (last 
visited March 26, 2017). 
52 Susan J. Hankin, Not A Living Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status 
of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J. L. & POL’Y 314, 316 (2007). 
53 Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 103. 
54 Id. at 105. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 107. 
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correlation appears to result from the batterer’s concerted 
strategy to take advantage of the intimate family 
environment for his or her own purposes. Abusers batter pets 
to establish their power, instill fear, and encourage the “habit 
of compliance” among their human victims. 57  Abusers 
recognize that harming or threatening a human victim’s pet 
is a viable strategy to coerce the human victim to do what 
the abuser wants. 58  Customized versions of the Duluth 
Model of Power and Control, frequently used to illustrate 
locus of authority and influence in domestic violence 
settings, identify the elements of this concerted strategy.59 
 As part of the family, pets exist within the same 
environment that permits violence to occur against human 
victims. This violence is fostered by the privacy associated 
with the home and the position of “power and control” that 
abusers can exercise over pets due to their “dependent 
status” and “smaller physical stature.” 60  Even more 
importantly, abusers react with jealousy to the strong 
emotional attachments that exist between their human 
victims and pets.61  
                                                 
57  Jennifer Robbins, Note, Recognizing the Relationship Between 
Domestic Violence and Animal Abuse: Recommendations for Change to 
the Texas Legislature, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 129, 133 (2006). 
58 Faver & Strand, supra note 39, at 238. 
59  See How Are Animal Abuse and Family Violence Linked?, 
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/faqs/what-is-the-link (last visited July 30, 
2017) (applying the Power and Control Wheel to issues at the intersection 
of domestic violence and animal abuse); Wheels: Understanding the 
Power and Control Wheel, https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wheels/ (last 
visited July 30, 2017) (explaining descriptive “wheels,” including the 
Power and Control Wheel, developed by the Domestic Abuse Intervention 
Programs). 
60 Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 107. 
61 Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 172. This article also 
postulates that there are two key reasons why domestic violence victims 
may form unique emotional attachments to their pets. First, battered 
women may identify with pets that have been similarly abused, and 
second, pets may serve as emotional substitutes who fill the need of 
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 Abusers manipulate these bonds between human 
abuse victims and their pets. Because these pets are so 
important to the human subjects of domestic violence, 
abusers can harm and threaten the pets in order to further 
harm and coerce their human victims.62 The abuser can use 
the pet to convince the victim to come home or drop criminal 
charges.63 Analysts identify this strategy among abusers as a 
negative surrogacy, where the abuser targets the animal to 
hurt and control the human victim in a phenomenon known 
as “triangling.”64 In one of Flynn’s studies, female victims 
of family abuse cited their emotional attachment to the pet 
as being part of the reason why their abusers targeted the 
animals.65  One woman insightfully stated, “[the pet] was 
like an extension of me, you know? And . . . maybe he 
abused the dog ‘cause [sic] he . . . didn’t want to go to jail 
for abusing me . . . .”66 Another stated of her abuser, “I think 
he uses the dog big time to hurt us . . . .”67 Similar examples 
of abusers using violence against pets to hurt human victims 
play out in communities across the country.68 The Knoxville 
News Sentinel, for example, reported on felony animal abuse 
charges filed against a man who broke the neck of his 
                                                 
companionship for battered women, who are often socially isolated by 
their abusers. Id. at 168–74. 
62 Faver & Strand, supra note 39, at 238. 
63 Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 172. 
64 Id. at 174. 
65 Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 107. 
66 Id. at 110. 
67 Id. at 109. 
68 Articles summarizing published reports of incidents and legal actions 
involving the link between animal abuse and domestic violence are 
regularly published in the LINK-Letter, a newsletter produced by the 
National Link Coalition.  These articles are available on the National 
Link Coalition’s website at http://nationallinkcoalition.org/resources/link-
letter-archives.  
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stepdaughter’s Jack Russell terrier puppy in order to 
“torment” his estranged wife.69 
 Even in situations where the abuser does not threaten 
or harm the pet, targets of family violence are often 
emotionally scarred by their pets’ reactions to the abuse that 
the pets witness. 70  One woman described being upset 
because her dog “panics” and “starts shivering” when the 
abuser yells at her.71 In sum, all abuse, whether it be of a 
human or a pet, contributes to the “climate of . . . terror” that 
perpetuates further violence.72 
  
4. Community Action in Response to Abuse 
 
 Society at large has begun to take notice of the 
connection between human and nonhuman victims of abuse. 
Academic studies are one indicator of this emerging 
acknowledgment of this linkage.73 Changes to legal process 
and even law itself are others. In addition, there has been a 
focus on enforcement efforts against perpetrators of animal 
cruelty in the hopes that they will help diminish violence 
against humans.74 This enforcement rationale suggests that 
                                                 
69 Michael Silence, A felony animal abuse case, KNOX NEWS, Feb. 1, 
2005, http://www.wate.com/story/2919445/man-gets-two-years-in-plea-
deal-on-puppy-killing. 
70 Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 116. 
71 Id. at 117. 
72 Id. at 113. 
73 A bibliography of academic studies in this area is available at 
http://animaltherapy.net/animal-abuse-human-violence/bibliography/.  
74 GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 122–25 
(Temple University Press 1995) (citing a variety of judicial opinions 
concerning animal cruelty to distinguish direct and indirect duties). 
Francione concludes that, although some judicial opinions interpret 
animal cruelty statutes as creating duties owed directly to the animals, 
others emphasize a “dual purpose” where the duty owed to the animal is 
indirect. Id. at 122. The author reiterates that, “the primary rationale for 
the anticruelty statutes is essentially that cruelty to animals has a 
detrimental impact on the moral development of human beings.” Id. at 
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one potent reason why society cares about animal rights is 
because animal interests are intertwined with human 
interests.75  
One important change in this area is the growing 
emphasis on including animals in orders of protection.76 In 
Tennessee, for example, a protective order may “direc[t] the 
care, custody or control of any animal owned, possessed, 
leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor residing in the 
household.”77 The Tennessee statute also insists that animals 
be placed in the direct custody of the petitioner or in animal 
foster care, emphasizing that the animal should never be 
placed in the custody of the respondent to the protective 
order. 78  Although the Tennessee Code does not extend 
protection to first responders who help the abuse victim 
remove pets from the household, such aid is available 
through the internal guidelines of various law enforcement 
offices.79   
                                                 
125. An emphasis on indirect duties is also prevalent in some theories of 
animal ethics. See, e.g., PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ANIMALS ISSUE 146 
(Cambridge University Press 1992) (“[S]ome ways of treating animals 
are morally wrong . . . but only because of what those actions may show 
us about the moral character of the agent. This will then be a form of 
indirect moral significance for animals that is independent of the fact that 
many rational agents care about animals, and hate to see them suffer.”). 
75 Livingston, supra note 36, at 5. 
76 As of 2016, thirty-two states, plus Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico, 
have enacted statutes that permit the inclusion of pets in protection 
orders.  For more details about the statutory language in each state, see 
Rebecca F. Wisch, Domestic Violence and Pets:  List of States that 
Include Pets in Protection Orders, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL 
CENTER (2016), https://www.animallaw.info/article/domestic-violence-
and-pets-list-states-include-pets-protection-orders. 
77 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606(a)(9) (2016). 
78 Id. 
79 Telephone interview with Jackie Roberts, Case Coordinator, Family 
Justice Center in Knoxville, Tenn. (June 20, 2008). As part of their 
standard operations, Knoxville police officers “standby” for fifteen 
minutes while the victim retrieves personal belongings from the house. 
For safety reasons, this standby procedure is never utilized at night. Id. 
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In other rule making, state legislatures are increasing 
penalties for animal abuse. All fifty states currently have 
felony provisions for animal cruelty. 80  In Tennessee, a 
perpetrator’s first animal cruelty offense is a Class A 
misdemeanor,81 punishable by no more than 11 months and 
29 days of incarceration, along with a fine not to exceed 
$2,500. 82  Any subsequent offense is a Class E felony, 83 
requiring incarceration for one to six years and a fine up to 
$3,000.84 Tennessee has a separate statute, however, to deal 
with aggravated animal cruelty, which occurs when a person 
“intentionally kills or intentionally causes serious physical 
injury to a [pet]” in a manner that exhibits “aggravated 
cruelty” that has “no justifiable purpose.” 85  Aggravated 
cruelty is a Class E felony.86  
                                                 
80 Animal Cruelty Facts and Stats, http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_ 
neglect/facts/animal_cruelty_facts_statistics.html (last visited March 26, 2017).  
In recent years, activists have concluded that the best pragmatic approach 
to achieving greater protection for pets is to emphasize how animal abuse 
serves as an indicator of interpersonal violence.  The increase in state 
felony laws from five in 1990 to fifty today parallels the renewed focus 
on the link between different types of violence, as highlighted by the 
American Humane Society, The Humane Society of the United States, 
the Animal Welfare Institute, the National Link Coalition, and other 
animal protection organizations and institutions.  For instance, 
legislators in both Pennsylvania and Texas recently cited the link 
between violence to animals and people in enacting an overhaul of those 
states’ anti-cruelty statutes.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania Cites Link in 
Enhancing Cruelty Penalties, THE LINK-LETTER (July 2017), at 1, 
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LinkLetter-
2017-July-v3.pdf; Link Cited as Rationale for Increased Cruelty Penalties, 
The LINK-Letter (July 2017), at 3, http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/LinkLetter-2017-July-v3.pdf. 
81 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-202(g)(1) (2016). 
82 Id. § 40-35-111(e)(1). 
83 Id. § 39-14-202(g)(2). 
84 Id. § 40-35-111(b)(5). 
85 Id. § 39-14-212(a). 
86 Id. § 39-14-212(d). 
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Another important area of animal protection 
legislation is cross-reporting as among child and adult 
protective services and animal abuse responders. 87 
Tennessee requires that any agency or government employee 
involved in “child or adult protective services” report 
suspected animal abuse to the appropriate animal protection 
authority.88 In order to make cross-reporting as potent as 
possible, states also need to require humane society 
investigators to report to social workers when they suspect 
child abuse or domestic violence. 89  Other states have 
extended mandatory reporting into other professions, such as 
by requiring veterinarians to report suspected animal 
abuse. 90  Many states, for example, either require 
veterinarians to report suspected animal abuse or provide 
immunity if veterinarians report such information, 
prescriptions that resemble child abuse reporting 
requirements.91 
As a logical extension of these legislative efforts, 
Tennessee law also provides for an animal abuse registry 
akin to sex offender registries provided for by law in 
Tennessee and elsewhere.92 At the time work on this article 
was completed, the registry included information on eight 
                                                 
87 The National Link Coalition produces summaries of state cross-reporting 
requirements (mandatory and permissive), based on the nature of required 
reporters (e.g., child protection, adult protective services, animal care and 
control, and veterinary professionals) and type of abuse. These summaries 
are available at http://nationallinkcoalition.org/resources/articles-research.  
88 Id. § 38-1-402(a). 
89 Heather D. Winters, Updating Ohio’s Animal Cruelty Statute: How 
Human Interests Are Advanced, 29 CAP. UNIV. L. REV. 857, 868 (2002). 
90 Gentry, supra note 47, at 104. 
91  Abuse Reporting Requirements by State, https://www.avma.org/ 
KB/Resources/Reference/AnimalWelfare/Pages/Abuse-Reporting-
requirements-by-State.aspx (last visited April 1, 2017). 
92 Tennessee Animal Abuser Registration Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-
39-401–404 (2016). 
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convicted animal abusers. 93  Although Tennessee was the 
first state to adopt legislation of this kind, municipalities in 
other states have started to implement animal abuse 
registries. 94  The effect of these still-young initiatives is 
unclear, but they do represent another socio-legal response 
to the link between human and animal abuse.95 
In perhaps the most novel development, Connecticut 
has recently passed legislation (“Desmond’s Law”) allowing 
animals to have court-appointed advocates to represent them 
in abuse and cruelty cases.96 Either the prosecutor or the 
defense attorney may request the animal advocate, and the 
judge has discretion as to whether to make the appointment. 
At this time, seven lawyers and a law professor are approved 
as volunteer advocates. The passage of the law appears to be 
connected to concern over both the link between animal 
abuse and violence against people and the paucity of animal 
abuse cases resulting in a conviction. 
                                                 
93  See Tennessee Animal Abuse Registry, Tennessee Bureau of 
Investigation, https://www.tn.gov/tbi/topic/tennessee-animal-abuse-
registry (last visited July 30, 2017). 
94  See Karin Brulliard, Animal abusers are being registered like sex 
offenders in these jurisdictions, WASH. POST (September 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/animalia/wp/2016/09/13/anima
l-abusers-are-being-registered-like-sex-offenders-in-these-
jurisdictions/?utm_term=.4dd192c8abd8.  
95 See id. (“The registries are part of widening efforts in the United States 
to punish and track animal abusers, who, research has shown, commit 
violence against people at higher rates than normal.”).  Bills introducing 
state animal abuse registries were introduced in a number of state 
legislatures during the 2017 legislative sessions.  New State Animal 
Abuser Registries Proposed in 2017, https://www.navs.org/new-state-
animal-abuser-registries-proposed-2017/#.WYiRDq3MxAY. 
96  See, e.g., Laurel Wamsley, In a First, Connecticut’s Animals Get 
Advocates in the Courtroom, THE TWO-WAY (June 2, 2017), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/02/531283235/in-a-
first-connecticuts-animals-get-advocates-in-the-
courtroom?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&utm_ca
mpaign=npr&utm_term=nprnews&utm_content=20170603. 
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 Beyond legislation, the judiciary has begun to 
highlight the presence of animal abuse in cases involving 
domestic violence (especially child abuse), exposing the 
interrelationships among the three types of household 
violence. 97  In one Kentucky case, the judge permitted 
joinder of interrelated child abuse and animal cruelty charges 
when the defendants allegedly sexually abused their children 
and used their pets for sexual gratification. 98  In another 
brutal case out of Oregon, a jury convicted Charles Smith of 
murdering his pregnant wife by tying her hands and feet 
behind her back and leaving her to die of exposure in a 
remote area. At trial, the state presented evidence of Smith’s 
long history of violence against both women and animals, 
including how he threw a kitten into a burning woodstove 
and beat his wife’s puppy to death.99   
 Beyond the research initiatives on the link between 
animal abuse and human aggression and the legislative, 
regulatory, and judicial activity that they have engendered, 
practical issues have emerged in handling matters at the 
intersection of animal and human violence. For example, 
there is widespread concern about the adequacy of social 
services offered to victims of domestic violence. 100  A 
particularly salient concern is the fact that most domestic 
violence shelters do not take in the animals of human 
domestic violence victims. 
 
B. No Room at the Inn: Most Domestic Violence 
Shelters Do Not Accept Pets 
 
 As an extension of the emerging interest in the 
connection between domestic violence and animal abuse, 
researchers have begun to highlight and criticize the failure 
                                                 
97 Gentry, supra note 47, at 104.  
98 Id. at 104–05. 
99 Id. at 105. 
100 Faver & Strand, supra note 39, at 243. 
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of domestic violence shelters to evaluate or address the 
importance of pets in the lives of domestic violence 
victims.101 Most domestic violence shelters do not accept 
pets, due to “health regulations, space limitations, additional 
costs, and potential liabilities.”102 Concerned members of 
the community have begun to change this norm,103 but the 
situation persists.  
Researchers stress that shelter staff should inquire 
about pets at intake and take seriously the victims’ emotional 
turmoil about leaving their pets.104 In Wisconsin, Quinlisk 
found that large, urban shelters asked abuse victims about 
their pets during intake, while small, rural shelters did not.105 
Quinlisk stressed that even if a shelter has no program to take 
in pets of domestic violence victims, merely expressing 
concern and helping them “brainstorm” about their options 
for their pets is helpful.106 Over two-thirds of those surveyed 
whose pets had been abused expressed concern for the safety 
of those pets.107 In another study by Flynn, all of the abuse 
                                                 
101 Id.; see also Frank R. Ascione, The Abuse of Animals and Human 
Interpersonal Violence: Making the Connection, in CHILD ABUSE, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND ANIMAL ABUSE 50, 56 (Frank R. Ascione & 
Phil Arkow eds., 1999) (83% of directors at surveyed domestic violence 
shelters acknowledged an “overlap” between domestic violence and 
animal abuse, but only 28% of those shelters routinely ask their clients 
about animal abuse); Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 123 
(suggesting that shelter staff should inquire about pets at intake and 
consider establishing foster programs or on-site housing programs for 
pets, particularly because some women delay seeking shelter due to 
concern for their pets). 
102 THE HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., STARTING A SAFE HAVENS FOR ANIMALS 
PROGRAM 2, http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/2004_ 
SafeHavens_Guide.pdf [hereinafter HSUS, SAFE HAVENS]. 
103 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
104 Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 123. 
105 Quinlisk, supra note 22, at 173. 
106 Id. 
107 Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 170.  
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victims who were interviewed wished that the shelter could 
accommodate their animals.108   
 Some victims of family violence delay coming to a 
domestic violence shelter out of concern for their animals, 
which indicates the gravity of the failure to shelter the pets 
of battered women. In Ascione’s study, 18% of those 
surveyed delayed seeking shelter out of concern for their 
pets’ safety. 109  Similarly, eight women, or 18.6% of 
respondents, in one of Flynn’s studies delayed seeking 
shelter for themselves due to their pets. 110  All of them 
acknowledged that their pets had also been victims of abuse; 
five of them delayed coming to the shelter for over two 
months.111 A staff member at the shelter told the researcher 
that one woman who had come to the shelter on three 
separate occasions during his study returned home each time 
because she feared for the safety of her pet.112 
Yet, as striking as these numbers and stories may be, 
research involving abuse victims in domestic violence 
shelters likely understates the overall risk to those victims 
because there most certainly are victims who never seek 
shelter at all (at least in part because of a fear that their pets 
will be abused or killed if they leave the household).113 This 
shortcoming in the empirical data on abuse victims is likely 
to persist because the study population is difficult to identify. 
Even interviewing unsheltered domestic violence victims 
whose abusers are arrested would not completely overcome 
                                                 
108 Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 118. 
109 Ascione, Women’s Reports, supra note 10, at 125. 
110 Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 170. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 172. 
113 See Samantha Cowan, No Dog Left Behind: Pet-Friendly Domestic 
Violence Shelter Makes It Easier to Leave, TAKEPART (Oct. 17, 2015), 
http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/10/17/domestic-violence-pets 
(“The institute’s findings support past studies, which have found that up 
to 50 percent of women delay leaving abusive situations out of concern 
for their pets.”). 
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the deficiency (although that certainly would be a valuable 
contribution). Regardless, however, it seems likely that 
domestic violence victims who delay leaving an abusive 
situation may actually be risking their own lives to protect 
their pets, making animal sheltering a key concern for all 
social workers and human services professionals.114  
Having said that, this research on human domestic abuse 
victims and their pets reveals that the humans are not the 
only ones at risk in this situation. If a human victim of family 
violence leaves a domestic violence situation without 
securing the safety of a pet, the pet is at a significant risk of 
abuse. In Flynn’s in-depth interviews with domestic 
violence victims, he explored the fears that women had when 
they were separated from their pets while at the domestic 
violence shelter.115 Some women had been fortunate enough 
to leave their pets with family or friends, while six were 
compelled to give their pets away or take them to a local 
animal shelter, which typically would require surrender of 
ownership of the animals.116 Slightly over half of the women 
had left their pets with their abusers.117 One of those women 
worried that her husband was not feeding her dog, while 
another received threats from her husband that he would take 
their dog away from her.118 It is noteworthy, however, that 
temporary fostering was open to these women, and Flynn 
concluded that the women who deeply feared that their 
abusers would hurt their pets put them in foster care before 
                                                 
114 Quinlisk, supra note 22, at 173. 
115 Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 119. 
116 Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 169–70. Most animal 
shelters require women to surrender ownership and many shelters 
assume that they own pets that are brought to them. See FRANK R. 
ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS FOR PETS 38–39 (2000), 
http://vachss.com/guest_dispatches/ascione_safe_havens.pdf 
[hereinafter ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS]. 
117 Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 170. 
118 Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 119. 
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coming to the domestic violence shelter.119 Even though the 
women who left their pets at home recognized that these pets 
might be abused or neglected, they expressed guilt at taking 
their pets away from abusers who also had also developed 
relationships with the pets. 120   The psychological and 
emotional impacts of the many disruptions in a violent 
household are fraught with complexity. 
 
C. Promising New Developments with Undesirable 
Side Effects 
 
 In reaction to the grave dangers that develop due to 
the lack of safe shelter for battered women’s pets, novel 
arrangements are beginning to crop up to address the 
problem. A growing number of domestic violence shelters 
and social services organizations are taking part in efforts to 
aid animals that are affected by domestic violence. 121 
Domestic violence shelters have begun to welcome pets, 
despite the practical and legal barriers to doing so. 122  In 
Columbus, Ohio, social workers developed an innovative 
program in which the pets of battered women are taken to a 
women’s prison, where the inmates care for them.123 These 
and other similar efforts should be encouraged and 
supported. But until they are more universally and uniformly 
available, other (potentially less desirable) options will 
continue to play strong roles. 
                                                 
119 Id. at 120. 
120 Id. at 119–20. 
121 Faver & Strand, supra note 39, at 243. 
122  See Bridgid Schulte, Sheltering Women—and Their Pets, Too, 
WASHINGTON POST, (Nov. 8, 2007) http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/07/AR2007110700860.html; SAF-T 
Shelters, http://alliephillips.com/saf-tprogram/saf-t-shelters/ (updated 
Feb. 2017). 
123 Pam Belluck, New Maine Law Shields Animals in Domestic Violence 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, (April 1, 2006) http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/01/us/ 
01pets.html?n=Top/Reference/TimesTopics/People. 
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Significant among those options, community-based 
sheltering in so-called “safe haven” programs may be the 
most common, though not very widespread. Safe haven 
programs typically are formed when domestic violence 
shelters partner with “animal shelters, animal care and 
control agencies, veterinary clinics, and private boarding 
kennels” in order “to provide temporary housing for victims’ 
pets.”124 Ascione’s 1999 survey identified 113 safe haven 
programs nationwide, the youngest of which were still in the 
conceptual phase 125  and the oldest of which had been 
operating for ten years. 126  The animal welfare agencies 
involved in these programs estimated that they sheltered a 
total of 2,000 to 50,000 animals per year. 127  Safe haven 
shelters are now more widely known and are more regularly 
noted and currently documented by various organizations.128 
This article focuses its core attention and proposal on pets 
sheltered apart from their owners in safe haven programs.  
The general attributes and operations of a safe haven 
program are explained in the “Starting a Safe Havens for 
Animals Program” brochure that is available on the website 
of the Humane Society of the United States129 and in the 
“Safe Havens for Pets” brochure produced by Ascione.130 
The Humane Society brochure prefers that domestic 
violence shelters serve as the “primary referring agency for 
animals who require temporary foster care,” but it 
encourages safe haven programs to consider accepting 
referrals from other sources, such as the police and animal 
shelters.131 Personnel need to be available at all times for 
animal intake because many domestic violence victims must 
                                                 
124 HSUS, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 102, at 2.  
125 See ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116, at 3. 
126 See id. at 5. 
127 See id. at 6. 
128 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
129 HSUS, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 102. 
130 ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116. 
131 HSUS, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 102, at 3. 
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flee their homes during the night.132 Moreover, the brochure 
strongly suggests that veterinarians should immediately 
check the animals.133 Safe haven programs commonly use 
animal shelters, foster homes, veterinary clinics, and private 
kennels to house the animals.134 In Ascione’s survey of safe 
haven programs, for example, only three domestic violence 
shelters (roughly 14% of the shelters interviewed) indicated 
that they could shelter pets at their own facilities.135 Most 
programs offer sheltering services for fourteen to thirty 
days.136 Due to safety concerns and the stress of visits, it is 
unadvisable to allow the human victim to visit her pet during 
sheltering.137  
 The brochures also address procedures through 
which the victims reclaim their pets. In many (if not most) 
cases, the expectation is that the women and their pets will 
move to a new home where they are more likely to be free 
from abuse. However, some women decide to return to their 
abusers. The Humane Society brochure acknowledges that 
this outcome is “frustrating” and advises shelter personnel to 
“educate the victim about the dangers of returning” to a 
“potentially harmful situation.” 138  However, the brochure 
does no more to elaborate on the serious risks that humans 
and pets face when they return to an abusive home. Instead, 
the brochure concludes that “the program will have to allow 
the victim to reclaim the pet and return to the abuser if the 
victim so chooses.”139  
 Ascione’s “Safe Havens for Pets” brochure reaches 
the same conclusion.140 Ascione reminds us that “[l]eaving a 
                                                 
132 Id. at 4. 
133 Id. at 5. 
134 ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116, at 19. 
135 Id. at 8. 
136 HSUS, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 102, at 5. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 6. 
139 Id. 
140 ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116, at 51. 
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batterer is often a process rather than a one-time decision” 
and that “[w]omen should not be coerced into remaining 
away from batterers by preventing them from retrieving pets 
from a SHP program.” 141  He recognizes that this policy 
sometimes produces “horror stories,” recounting an incident 
where a woman came to the safe haven shelter with her 
batterer to reclaim her pet. 142  Nonetheless, scholars and 
social workers typically do not challenge the premise that 
abused women should be able to reclaim their pets regardless 
of their intentions. Moreover, as Part II illustrates, the law’s 
conception of pets as personal property supports a domestic 
violence victim’s right to reclaim her animal.  
This article suggests that we should rethink this 
assumption. By allowing domestic violence victims to 
reclaim their pets and return with them to an abusive 
household, safe haven programs perpetuate the cycle of 
human and animal violence. The safe haven movement, 
designed to solve a pressing social problem—ensuring the 
temporary safety and welfare of pets of human abuse 
victims—raises compelling philosophical, legal, and ethical 
issues. However, a solution to this safe haven conundrum—
an issue at the intersection of the emotional and 
psychological needs and legal rights of humans, on the one 
hand, and the socio-legal aspects of animal protection, on the 
other—may be possible. A potential solution lies in the 
combination of traditional property and contract law 
concepts with current legal and public policy support for 
animal protection. 
 
II. Animals, Property, and Rights: Legal Rules Relevant 
to a Resolution of the Safe Haven Conundrum 
 
If the law is to provide a solution to the safe haven 
conundrum, it is important to understand current legal rules 
                                                 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 68. 
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relating to animals. This Part identifies certain relevant legal 
rules relating to animals and summarizes salient aspects of 
the history and development of those rules. The Part also 
makes certain observations about those legal rules in light of 
their nature, history, and development. 
 
A. Animals as Property in the Current Legal 
Paradigm 
 
 Because pets are classified as property under the 
current legal paradigm, a brief overview of certain elements 
of property law is necessary to any disposition of the safe 
haven conundrum.143 From a legal standpoint, property is a 
bundle of rights related to a given object, making it a 
fundamental organizing principle of any legal system. 144 
American law traditionally treats animals as property in the 
                                                 
143  Property status has, of course, been an important part of the 
conceptualization of animals for centuries, if not millennia. Aristotelian 
and Stoic philosophies espoused teleological anthropocentrism—the 
belief that the physical world was designed for use by humans, as 
exemplified by the concept of the Great Chain of Being. Steven M. Wise, 
How Nonhuman Animals were Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe, 1 
ANIMAL L. 15, 19–24 (1995). Various developments—including, but not 
limited to, the rise of modern science and the environmental 
movement—have tempered enthusiasm for the notion of human 
dominion over the natural world. Id. at 34–41. Nonetheless, 
commentators continue to debate whether modern concepts such as 
evolution truly detract from the position that human interests are superior 
to animal interests. Compare Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property 
Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 559–64 (1998) (arguing 
that “[t]he gulf between humans and other animals evaporated in the 
Darwinian revolution” and that “the ranking of humans in evolution” 
does not “giv[e] humans special status and rights”) with CARRUTHERS, 
supra note 74, at 143–45 (arguing that “human beings are continuous 
with the rest of the natural world, having evolved, like any other species 
of animal, through a process of natural selection,” but that only humans 
are “rational agents” who deserve “direct rights”).  
144 David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 
473, 477 (2000) [hereinafter Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership]. 
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same way that a book or chair is property.145 We can buy and 
sell our pets, and they can also be the subject of bailment 
agreements and the object of theft.146  
Historically, states have viewed animals as “personal 
property without any special value.”147 In 1857, for example, 
a Tennessee court affirmed a human owner’s property rights 
in a dog.148 With this mindset, some states were reluctant to 
create a definition of “pet” or “companion animal” in their 
statutory codes.149 The law typically “denies all justice to all 
nonhuman animals”; legal rights inuring to an animal’s 
benefit generally are exercised by the animal’s owner or 
legal guardian or the state, while legal duties in relation to 
an animal are owed to the animal’s owner or legal guardian 
or the state via statute.150  
                                                 
145 Hankin, supra note 52, at 317. 
146 Id. at 321. 
147 Merry B. Guben, Animal Law Litigation: On the Road to a Modern 
View with some Landmarks Along the Way, 77 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 58, 59 
(2006). 
148 Wheatley v. Harris, 36 Tenn. 468, 468 (1857) (“[T]he law upon the 
point of the master's property in a dog is well settled.”). 
149 See Guben, supra note 147, at 59. But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-
403(b) (2016) (stepping away from this traditional view by defining a 
“pet” as “any domesticated cat or dog normally maintained in or near the 
household of the owner”); id. § 39-14-201(3) (defining a “non-livestock 
animal” as “a pet normally maintained in or near the household . . . of its 
owner . . . other domesticated animal, previously captured wildlife, an 
exotic animal, or any other pet, including but not limited to, pet rabbits, 
a pet chick, duck, or pot bellied pig that is not classified as ‘livestock’ . . 
. .”). 
150 Wise, supra note 143, at 17; Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership, supra 
note 144, at 480–81, 494 (describing the unique situation of wildlife). 
The state does not possess title in wildlife, but instead it “has the right to 
decide the conditions under which humans can obtain title” in wildlife, 
so that unless they are in captivity, wild animals possess self-ownership. 
Id. at 481. While some progress has been made in this area over the 
course of the time that this article was researched and written, the 
property law norms applicable to questions involving animals and law 
are well entrenched. See, e.g., Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. 
v. Stanley, 49 Misc. 3d 746, 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (granting standing 
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Yet, these conceptions of animals do not harmonize 
well with the modern reality of pet ownership. As noted in 
Part I.A.3, victims of family violence may describe their pets 
as family members, echoing the mentality of many in society 
at large. We view pets on an entirely different plane than we 
view inanimate property.151 As Kathy Hessler suggests: 
 
People do not plan memorial services, or 
invest in serious medical treatment for their 
books or lawnmowers. They don’t plan to 
pay more in insurance premiums than the 
purchase price or replacement cost of the 
property they seek to protect. Individuals do 
not leave money for their bicycles in their 
wills, or seek visitation arrangements for 
their televisions upon the termination of their 
marriages. Yet individuals attempt to do all 
these things and more for their companion 
animals.152  
 
Law, as the embodiment of social values, should reflect this 
distinction. 
Persistent social norms, however, sanction the 
human domination of animals, which tends to create 
                                                 
to a nonprofit organization to commence a proceeding for a writ of 
habeas corpus on behalf of two chimpanzees held as research subjects 
but ultimately denying habeas corpus relief). 
151 See, e.g., Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., 49 Misc. 3d at 
766 (“[S]ome animals, such as pets and companion animals, are 
gradually being treated as more than property, if not quite as persons, in 
part because legislatures and courts recognize the close relationships that 
exist between people and their pets, who are often viewed and treated by 
their owners as family members.”); Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc. 3d 447, 
451 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (“Where once a dog was considered a nice 
accompaniment to a family unit, it is now seen as an actual member of 
that family, vying for importance alongside children.”). 
152 Kathy Hessler, Mediating Animal Law Matters, 2 J. ANIMAL L. & 
ETHICS 21, 28 (2007). 
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ambiguity and ambivalence in prevailing legal structures. In 
many cases, the law and legal process remain virtually 
straitjacketed by the fact that animals are property, and 
property cannot have rights.153 Animal cruelty is typically a 
crime under state law,154 and our laws generally proscribe 
unnecessary harm to animals.155 Yet this proscription is a 
weak form of protection, in part because of the way in which 
we balance human interests against animal interests to make 
a determination of necessary harm.156 In this balancing act, 
“animals almost never prevail, irrespective of what might be 
the relatively trivial human interest at stake and the relatively 
weighty animal interest involved . . . .”157 Even where the 
interests of animals may or should prevail, their abuse is hard 
to detect, and the penalties for their abusers still pale in 
comparison to penalties for some human violence or other 
related crimes, compelling prosecutors to seek punishment 
for something other than animal cruelty.158 While it may be 
                                                 
153 See FRANCIONE, supra note 74, at 4; Matter of Nonhuman Rights 
Project, Inc., 49 Misc. 3d at 765 (“For purposes of establishing rights, 
the law presently categorizes entities in a simple, binary, ‘all-or-nothing’ 
fashion. ‘Persons have rights, duties, and obligations; things do not.’”).  
154 See infra Part II.C.1. 
155 See FRANCIONE, supra note 74, at 4.  
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158  Human violence often accompanies animal violence and is 
punishable at higher felony levels. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
212(b) (2016) (stating that charge accompanying the least culpable 
mental state for homicide, criminally negligent homicide, is punished as 
a Class E felony) with id. § 39-14-212(d) (dictating the most severe form 
of animal cruelty in Tennessee is punished as a Class E felony). 
Furthermore, other violations such as tax evasion and gambling often 
accompany cock and dog fighting, and penalties for those crimes are 
more stringent. Compare id. § 67-1-1440(g) (criminalizing tax evasion 
is a Class E felony) and id. § 39-17-504(c) (1989) (classifying 
aggravated gambling promotion as a Class E felony) with id. § 39-14-
203(c)–(d) (categorizing dog fighting as a Class E felony, being a 
spectator at a dogfight as a Class B or C misdemeanor, and cock fighting 
as a Class A misdemeanor). Thus, scarce prosecutorial resources are 
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easier to identify and successfully prosecute crimes other 
than animal cruelty in some of these cases, the focus of 
enforcement efforts on other criminal activity accompanying 
animal abuse and away from animal abuse itself may tend to 
reify and entrench perceptions that animals and animal abuse 
are unimportant (or always less important than human life 
and criminal activity—like tax evasion or gambling—
implicating only human victims). Legislative initiatives 
defining domestic violence to include animal cruelty—
enabling prosecutors to file for either or both crimes159—
highlight the importance of animal welfare but may or may 
not change these perceptions. In general, the legal 
conception of animals as property drives, supports, and 
embeds these and other related patterns in law enforcement 
and the use of legal process. As a result, overall, a pure 
property law approach to animals has increasingly proven 
unworkable in a contemporary context. 
 
B. Changing Perceptions of Animals in the Legal 
Order 
 
In light of increasing ethical, social, and legal tension 
in balancing animal and human interests, commentators have 
suggested a variety of new legal paradigms for pets.160 At 
one extreme lies the “animal rights” perspective, which 
suggests that we should remove property status from animals 
                                                 
often better spent on crimes other than animal cruelty. See Dog Fighting 
Fact Sheet, http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/dogfighting/ 
facts/dogfighting_fact_sheet.html?credit=web_id94655252 (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2017) (noting that “[b]ecause dogfighting yields such large 
profits, the penalties associated with misdemeanor convictions are much 
too weak to act as a sufficient deterrent, and are simply seen as the cost 
of doing business[]” and that dog fighting fosters other crime).  
159 The National Link Coalition quotes and cites to the state statutory 
definitions resulting from these initiatives in a document available at 
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/DV-CTA-
is-definition-of-DV-EA-2017-03a.pdf (last visited July 30, 2017).  
160 Hankin, supra note 52, at 381–88. 
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altogether, thus making them full-fledged legal right-
holders. 161   Gary L. Francione, for example, rejects 
accommodation with the traditional paradigm by framing the 
issue as a choice between two polar opposites: animals “are 
either persons, beings to whom the principle of equal 
consideration applies and who possess morally significant 
interests in not suffering, or things, beings to whom the 
principle of equal consideration does not apply and whose 
interests may be ignored if it benefits us. There is no third 
choice.”162 According to Francione, improving the treatment 
of animals within a property framework is insufficient—we 
must instead recognize the moral significance of animals by 
affording them “equal consideration.” 163  This standard 
would apply to any animal that is sentient and can suffer.164 
In practice, this framework would end the usage of animals 
as “resources” so that the “institutional exploitation of 
animals for food, biomedical experiments, entertainment, or 
clothing” would cease. 165  Although the animal rights 
perspective is both simple and, to many, compelling, 
significant criticisms have been levied against it.166 
                                                 
161 Kelch, supra note 143, at 532. 
162  Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL 
RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 131 (Oxford 
University Press, Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. 2004) 
(emphasis added). 
163  GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR 
CHILD OR THE DOG? 100–01 (Temple University Press 2000) 
[hereinafter FRANCIONE, YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG?].  
164 Id. at 82, 159. 
165  Id. at 102. Francione does accept that “conflicts may require 
accommodation of some sort” and that an animal’s legal rights may be 
“overridden by appropriate moral considerations,” such as that a human 
appropriately preferring to help another human over an animal “in 
situations of true emergency.” FRANCIONE, supra note 74, at 4, 10; see 
also FRANCIONE, YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG?, supra note 163, at 157–59. 
166 Among other things, commentators find the comparison that animal 
rights activists make between racism, sexism, and the current role of 
animals to be “inappropriate,” “distasteful,” and not cogent, while also 
arguing that the animal rights position devalues human life. For further 
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A countervailing viewpoint advocates the status quo. 
Animals have no rights beyond the “protections they have 
incident to the economic, aesthetic, and humanitarian 
interests of human beings. 167  The “aggregate” of human 
characteristics, including “the ability to express reason, to 
recognize moral principles, to make subtle distinctions, and 
to intellectualize” makes “humans fundamentally, 
importantly, and unbridgeably different from animals.”168 
Many advocates of this position argue that the social 
contract, as the underpinning of our legal system, is 
predicated on a consent of the governed that can only arise 
from these unique intellectual capabilities. 169  Therefore, 
                                                 
exploration of these critiques, see David Schmahmann & Lori 
Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for Animals, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 747, 757, 780 (1995). Comparisons between the current role of 
animals in our society and ancient and modern slavery, as well as 
analogies to societal prejudices against women and immigrants, are 
common in the animal rights literature. See, e.g., Favre, Equitable Self-
Ownership, supra note 144, at 477–78, 491; Kelch, supra note 143, at 
534; Wise, supra note 143, at 16. 
167 Schmahmann & Polecheck, supra note 166, at 759. 
168 Id. at 752. 
169 Id. at 754–55; see also CARRUTHERS, supra note 74, at 36, 194 (using 
contractualism to argue that morality is “a human construction[] created 
by human beings . . . to govern . . . relationships . . . in society[,]” and 
that humans owe no direct moral duties to animals because animals do 
not possess reason). Although some species have the ability to recognize 
“the beliefs and desires of others,” rationality also requires “a conception 
of social rules, and of what it might be for all to act under the same social 
rules.” Id. at 139. Compare JAMES B. REICHMANN, S.J., EVOLUTION, 
ANIMAL ‘RIGHTS,’ AND THE ENVIRONMENT 252 (Catholic University of 
America Press 2000) (“The human’s rationality totally penetrates and is 
suffused throughout his animality; it is not a distinct ‘quality’ added to 
it. This union of rationality and animality clearly differentiates the 
human from all other sentient beings whose animality is not a rational 
animality.”) with Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights: Legal, 
Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 57–58 (Oxford University 
Press, Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. 2004) (arguing that 
rights are not based on “cognitive capacity,” but instead that “legal rights 
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only humans can directly benefit from the rights bestowed 
by that social contract—the only practical measure of rights 
is human interests.170 The creation of full-fledged animal 
rights would be an unprecedented and destabilizing shift in 
our legal system that would demand the courts to enforce the 
interests of a new and vague constituency.171 This viewpoint 
ignores, however, how the current legal paradigm has 
already proven insufficient to handle the modern role of 
pets—an insufficiency that creates inefficiencies. 
Furthermore, the Kantian social contract that is often 
emphasized in this viewpoint is not the only justification for 
rights.172 
Finally, moderate activists urge a more nuanced 
approach between these two rubrics. Although the most 
radical animal rights advocates suggest changing pets’ status 
“to one approaching that of persons,” many suggest we 
should continue to conceive of pets as property, albeit with 
some significant qualifications.173 Elimination of title in pets 
                                                 
are instruments for securing the liberties that are necessary if a 
democratic system of government is to provide a workable framework 
for social order and prosperity. The conventional rights bearers are with 
minor exceptions actual and potential voters and economic actors. 
Animals do not fit this description . . . .”). 
170 Schmahmann & Polecheck, supra note 166, at 759, 760.  
171 Id. 
172 David Favre, Judicial Recognition of the Interests of Animals—A New 
Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 333, 334 (2000). Various justifications for 
human rights exist and are considered in the context of animals. See id. 
at 335. Kant assigned rights due to the dignity arising from rationality 
and self-awareness, but this conception has been criticized for excluding 
humans who do not have full rationality, unless the species is considered 
in the aggregate instead of individually. See also id. at 338 (stating that 
legal analysis should be based on a balancing of “conflicting interests”); 
Kelch, supra note 143, at 538–40 (the ability of a living being to 
experience pain and suffering makes it worthy of certain moral 
considerations); CARRUTHERS, supra note 74, at 13–26 (describing 
theism, intuitionism, utilitarianism, and contractualism as possible bases 
for moral duties). 
173 Hankin, supra note 52, at 385. 
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is “neither advisable nor feasible,” but it should be 
recognized that a pet is not the same sort of property as is an 
inanimate object. 174  Within this viewpoint, Carolyn 
Matlack’s formulation of pets as “sentient property” has 
garnered attention.175 Matlack’s definition encompasses any 
animal that is warm-blooded and domesticated, recognizing 
these animals as “living, feeling companions,” but not giving 
them any status that approaches personhood.176  
In a vein similar to Matlack, animal welfarists argue 
that “it is morally acceptable, at least under some 
circumstances, to kill animals or subject them to suffering as 
long as precautions are taken to ensure that the animal is 
treated as ‘humanely’ as possible.”177 This would involve a 
balancing of human and animal interests within what tends 
to be a utilitarian framework.178 Peter Singer argues that “we 
should give equal consideration to similar amounts of 
suffering, irrespective of the species (or order) of the beings 
who suffer” so that consideration is based on the individual, 
not the species.179 Furthermore, his framework suggests that 
humans tend to deserve a “higher degree of consideration” 
because our mental capacities make us capable of profound 
suffering.180 Thus, animal welfarists show it is possible to 
                                                 
174 Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership, supra note 144, at 484, 495. 
175 Hankin, supra note 52, at 386. 
176 Id. Compare this approach to that of animal rights advocate Joan 
Dunayer, who argues that all sentient beings “warrant full and equal 
moral consideration.” JOAN DUNAYER, SPECIESISM 4 (2004). 
177 FRANCIONE, supra note 74, at 6. 
178 Id. at 6–7. 
179 Peter Singer, Ethics and Animals, 13 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 45, 46 
(1990). 
180 Peter Singer, The Significance of Animal Suffering, 13 BEHAV. & 
BRAIN SCI. 9, 10 (1990) (“to be human is to possess certain 
characteristics distinctive of our species, such as the capacity for self-
awareness, for rationality, and for developing a moral sense . . . . It is not 
arbitrary to say that beings with these capacities live fuller lives than 
beings without them . . . .”). 
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tout our unique human attributes while nevertheless 
demanding better treatment of nonhuman animals. 
David Favre has articulated a salient legal 
compromise between property in animals and animal rights. 
Favre’s approach, like ours, is rooted in traditional notions 
of property law. He proposes that property interests in 
animals be divided into legal and equitable aspects, with 
legal title belonging to the human owner and equitable 
interest belonging to the animal itself, providing the animal 
with a hybrid form of self-ownership similar to a trust.181 
The courts would balance the competing interests between 
the legal title holder (the animal’s guardian) and the animal 
(equitable owner of itself) in order to reach the fairest 
outcome.182 Only the animal’s interests in fundamental life-
supporting activities would be considered. 183   With the 
stronger legal standing available to the animal under this 
legal framework, a more stringent and serious balancing of 
interests would occur between human and animal.     
 
C. Current Tensions Between the Legal and Social 
Conceptualization of Animals 
 
As suggested by the enthusiastic proponents of a 
variety of new paradigms, there is increasing tension 
between traditional legal conceptions of animals and the 
change that is occurring in society concerning animal well-
being. Despite welfare-oriented leaps forward in 
jurisprudence, traditional legal conceptions of animals as 
property persist; however, these conceptions become 
progressively less descriptive and trenchant as the societal 
interaction of animals and humans changes. As animals are 
treated more like humans in society, animals are being 
                                                 
181 Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership, supra note 144, at 491–92. 
182 Id. at 501. 
183 Id. at 498. 
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treated more like humans in the law. Both legislatures and 
courts are part of this change momentum. 
Specifically, with social realities—especially those 
involving human bonding with pets—bearing down, the law 
has shifted towards acknowledging animal welfare in several 
major respects. First, statutes against animal cruelty have 
proliferated and strengthened over the past several decades, 
although enforcement may not always be vigilant. Second, 
the law is shifting away from using fair market value as a 
measure of damages in veterinary malpractice actions, pet 
death cases, and emotional distress cases. Third, pet custody 
battles are growing in number and ferocity, forcing a 
reluctant legal system to address the issue. 
 
1. Pets in Criminal Law: Animal Cruelty Statutes 
Within the Framework of Property Rights 
 
All states have statutes criminalizing animal cruelty, 
and the level of concern in animal cruelty statutes is not 
generally replicated for inanimate property.184 Furthermore, 
the majority of states now categorize some forms of animal 
cruelty as misdemeanors and even felonies instead of petty 
offenses, whereas few states punished violators at the 
misdemeanor and felony level in the early 1990s.185 
                                                 
184 Hankin, supra note 52, at 324. Some judicial reasoning treats animal 
cruelty as a type of vandalism or as a charge that complements 
vandalism. See, e.g., People v. Baldacchino, NO. C046420, 2005 WL 
3249943, at *5 (Cal Ct. App. 2005) (noting that California has a general 
vandalism statute that is followed by more specific statutes that include 
topics such as vandalism of a church, certain types of damage to 
buildings, and animal cruelty, and urging that charges should be brought 
under one of the more specific statutes when possible); People v. Guido-
Silva, NO. A106831, 2005 WL 2203274, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
(considering a case where the defendant was charged with both animal 
cruelty and vandalism in relation to the death of a race horse and holding 
that to be guilty of vandalism, the defendant’s actions had to be a 
“proximate cause of damage to or destruction of the horse”).  
185 Hankin, supra note 52, at 367. 
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In addition to these harsher penalties, offenders in 
certain jurisdictions, including Tennessee, must forfeit 
custody of the animals that were the subject of the 
conviction. 186  In Tennessee, “any governmental animal 
control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee” 
receives custody of animals seized under the animal cruelty 
statute.187 Under Tennessee law, the court may also curtail 
or prohibit the person’s custody of animals for a period of 
time that it deems reasonable.188 In a 2005 North Carolina 
case, the Animal Legal Defense Fund sued and gained 
custody of dogs based on an anti-cruelty statute similar to 
Tennessee’s statute. 189  This marked the first time that a 
private organization was able to “enjoin an owner’s conduct 
and gain the right to control the animals’ welfare” through 
the use of an anti-cruelty statute.190 Thus, some of this state 
legislation has made pets more akin to children in the eyes 
of the law.  
The tension between property and human treatment 
is heightened in cases in which defendants charged with 
animal cruelty use their right to property as a defense to the 
search and seizure of the animals. Alleged perpetrators have 
defended against animal cruelty charges on the basis that the 
animals were seized during warrantless searches of the 
defendant’s property.191 In order to avoid a property debate, 
some courts focus on the evidentiary value of the animals 
instead of their suffering, effectively meeting the 
perpetrator’s property argument with a property-oriented 
response. 192  When the animals are viewed primarily as 
                                                 
186 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-202(e) (2016). 
187 Id. § 39-14-210(f). 
188 Id. § 39-14-202(e). 
189 Guben, supra note 147, at 68. 
190 Id. 
191 See Amie J. Dryden, Note, Overcoming the Inadequacies of Animal 
Cruelty Statutes and the Property-Based View of Animals, 38 IDAHO L. 
REV. 177, 202 (2001). 
192 Id. at 202–03. 
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evidence (rather than the victim) of a crime, several 
exceptions to the warrant rule come into play, such as the 
plain view exception.193  
Other exceptions to the warrant requirement place 
more value on the animal’s life. Some courts have been 
willing to proceed under the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement, which allows for 
warrantless seizures when immediate action is necessary to 
preserve life or evidence, thereby preventing the frustration 
of an important governmental interest. 194  Although they 
allow the seizure to stand, courts have hesitated when the 
peril of a nonhuman animal, rather than a human, forms the 
basis of the emergency.195 
The Michael Vick case is a well-known—albeit 
highly unusual—example of a custody transfer resulting 
from animal mistreatment. It is therefore analogous to the 
animal surrender and placement options available on a more 
routine basis in other locales. Vick’s pit bulls were seized in 
April 2007 based on suspicions of his involvement in a dog 
fighting ring. 196  Although fighting dogs are usually 
euthanized, animal sanctuaries and rehabilitation centers 
throughout the country took custody of most of the pit bulls 
after Vick agreed to pay almost a million dollars for their 
evaluation and care.197 This outcome is anomalous and was 
only available in this instance because Vick offered such a 
large sum for the care of the animals.  
 
  
                                                 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 203. 
195 Id. at 203–04. 
196 Juliet Macur, Given Reprieve, N.F.L. Star’s Dogs Find Kindness, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A1. 
197 Id. at A7. 
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2. Pets in Tort Law: Moving Beyond Fair Market 
Value When a Pet is Harmed or Killed 
 
When a wrongdoer harms or kills a pet, the 
traditional response by civil courts has been to award the 
owner damages based on the fair market value of the animal, 
which is often negligible (particularly if the pet is a mixed-
breed animal or of unknown descent) and certainly pales in 
comparison to the worth of the pet to the owner based on 
value attributable to companionship and related emotional 
attachment. 198  The traditional damages framework is 
beginning to recede, however.199 Critics of that framework 
argue that the use of a fair market value in calculating 
damage awards, which emphasizes economic cost at the 
expense of sentimental worth, leads to both “under-
compensation and under-deterrence.”200 Because the value 
of pets to many humans in the United States today cannot be 
adequately represented in economic terms through a fair 
market valuation, the availability of non-economic damages 
is integral if the common law is to meet the tort goals of 
“compensation, deterrence, and the reflection of societal 
values.”201 For the legal system to remain relevant, common 
law tort actions must keep pace with changing social 
values.202   
In 2000, Tennessee became the first state to provide 
an owner with a statutory remedy for non-economic 
damages in legal actions involving the death or injury of a 
                                                 
198  See Hankin, supra note 52, at 323; Lauren M. Sirois, Comment, 
Recovering for the Loss of a Beloved Pet: Rethinking the Legal 
Classification of Companion Animals and the Requirements for Loss of 
Companionship Tort Damages, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 1199, 1202–03 
(2015). 
199 See Dryden, supra note 191, at 199. 
200 Hankin, supra note 52, at 325 (internal footnote omitted). 
201 Waisman & Newell, supra note 48, at 46. 
202 Id. at 51 (quoting Dearborn Fabricating & Engr. Corp. v. Wickham, 
532 N.E.2d 16, 17–18 (Ind. App. 1988)). 
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pet.203 The relevant statute is known as the T-Bo Act, named 
after a Shih Tzu owned by Tennessee Congressman (and 
previously state senator) Steve Cohen. While in his yard, T-
Bo was seriously injured by a large dog that was running 
loose and died after “three days of frantic trips to the night 
emergency clinic and veterinarian . . . .”204 After this loss, 
Cohen realized that the damage awards for pets do not 
correspond to the value of a pet’s companionship, prompting 
him to introduce the T-Bo Act. 205  Cohen explained the 
impetus for the bill by lamenting that the only damages 
available to him upon T-Bo’s death were for “repairs, as if it 
were a clock or desk” and for the cost of buying a similar 
dog as a replacement.206 Thus, the T-Bo Act stipulates that 
an owner can receive up to $5,000 in non-economic 
damages 207  for “the loss of reasonably expected society, 
companionship, love, and affection”208 when a pet is harmed 
or killed. Tennessee’s statutory approach starkly contrasts to 
the common law in states like New York, which does not 
recognize “an independent cause of action for loss of the 
companionship of a pet.” 209  The Tennessee statute is 
particularly noteworthy because it recognizes the capability 
                                                 
203 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2000); Hankin, supra note 52, at 
338. 
204  Canine Loss Spurs New Law, ST. LEGISLATURES, (Oct. 1, 2000) 
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/3756789/canine-loss-spurs-
new-law. 
205  Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful 
Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court and Legislative Action and a 
Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 
215, 225 (2003) (quoting Waisman & Newell, supra note 48, at 69–70). 
206 Id. at 225 (quoting Waisman & Newell, supra note 48, at 70). 
207TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a) (2016). 
208Id. § 44-17-403(d). In pet death cases, courts in some states consider 
how much the owner has expended on the pet in the past in order to gauge 
how much the owner values the pet. See Hankin supra note 52 at 330–
31 (quoting Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 314 (Alaska 2001)). 
209  Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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of animals to be pets and the tendency of humans to form 
strong emotional bonds with those pets, thus beginning to 
address some of the shortcomings of the traditional legal 
paradigm which, as earlier noted, fails to recognize the 
companionship function of animals by providing a definition 
of “pet” or “companion animal” within the statutory law.210  
While recovery under the T-Bo Act is limited in 
terms of both the eligible claimants and the amount of 
damages that may be awarded, it is nonetheless an 
impressive and progressive first step. In 2003, Colorado 
representatives introduced a bill that allowed for up to 
$100,000 in damages for loss of pet companionship.211 The 
bill was withdrawn, however, very shortly after being 
introduced. 212  Since that time, state legislators have 
continued to introduce, and some state legislatures have 
passed, related legislation.213 
 The judiciary also has played a role in changing the 
legal conception of animals as property in tort actions. In the 
courts, we witness the same tension between old and new 
views with which the legislatures contend. For example, 
when grieving pet owners invoke the tort theory of 
                                                 
210 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
211  Elizabeth Paek, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family: 
Dismantling the Property Classification of Companion Animals by 
Statute, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 481, 518–19 (2003). 
212 H.B. 03-1260, 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003); see 
also, e.g., Gerald L. Eichinger, Veterinary Medicine: External Pressures 
on an Insular Profession and How Those Pressures Threaten to Change 
Current Malpractice Jurisdiction, 67 MONT. L. REV. 231, 255 
(2006); Victor E. Schwartz and Emily J. Laird Non-Economic Damages 
in Pet Litigation: The Serious Need To Preserve a Rational Rule, 33 
PEPP. L. REV. 227, 249 (2006). 
213 See Sirois, supra note 198, at 1203–04 (citing 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 70/16.3 (2014)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2016)); Julia 
Fidenzio, Massachusetts to Allow Non-Economic Damages for Loss of 
Pets, COMMITTEE ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://nysbar.com/blogs/animalaw/2010/02/massachusetts_to_allow_no
necon.html.  
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emotional distress or loss of companionship (consortium) in 
litigation, they move firmly beyond the realm of fair market 
value. Many jurisdictions struggle with the issue of whether 
an owner may sue under the tort theory of emotional distress 
if the distress arises from harm to a companion animal.214 
Some jurisdictions allow recovery for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress upon the pet owner, but not 
for negligent distress arising from harm to an animal.215 
These jurisdictions reason that “the affection of a master . . . 
is a very real thing.”216 Other state courts disallow recovery 
for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, reasoning that “owners cannot recover for 
emotional connections to their property.”217  
Despite the advent of statutes providing for non-
economic damages for harm to pets, pet owners or caretakers 
may need or desire access to “private, civil measures which 
deter wrongful acts and compensate the victims.”218 Among 
other things, recoveries in these private actions may yield 
larger damage awards against wrongdoers than these statutes 
permit. For instance, while the T-Bo Act caps damages at 
$5,000, some courts in other states have permitted 
compensatory damages in emotional distress cases that are 
ten times that amount.219 
 
  
                                                 
214 Hessler, supra note 152, at 44–45 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-
403 (West 2000); Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 543, 546 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2006)). 
215 Waisman & Newell, supra note 48; Steven M. Wise, Recovery of 
Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and 
Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of A Companion Animal, 
4 ANIMAL L. 33 (1998). 
216 La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964) 
(“the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing”). 
217 Waisman & Newell, supra note 48, at 65. 
218 TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2016).  
219 Id. § 44-17-403. 
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3. Pets in Family Law: Pet Custody Battles 
 
 Pet custody battles also raise questions that implicate 
the traditional legal conception of animals as property. 
Kathy Hessler suggests that divorcing couples use mediation 
to determine custody of their pets in order to avoid the court 
system, which is often unsympathetic and refuses to mediate 
between the parties concerning any sort of visitation rights 
pertaining to pets. 220  Unfortunately, if private mediation 
fails, the couple may nevertheless find themselves in the 
courthouse. In a Pennsylvania case, for example, a divorcing 
couple made a written agreement that purported to give 
custody of the couple’s dog to the wife while reserving 
visitation rights to the husband, although “[t]he ‘Agreement’ 
was never incorporated or merged into the Divorce 
Decree.” 221  The ex-husband later sued when the ex-wife 
violated this “Agreement.”222 In dismissing the complaint, 
the trial court emphasized that “any terms set forth in the 
Agreement are void to the extent that they attempt to award 
custodial visitation with or shared custody of personal 
property.”223 Most courts assert that disputes over pets are 
simply property disputes, so that any consideration of the 
“best interests” of the animal is inappropriate.224  
If judicial reasoning continues to evolve, however, 
courts may become sympathetic to parties filing claims for 
the resolution of animal custody issues. For instance, Alaska 
enacted a new statute in 2017 that permits courts to amend 
divorce or marriage dissolution agreements to include 
ownership of an animal, taking into consideration the well-
being of the animal.225 Other state legislatures have followed 
                                                 
220 Hessler, supra note 152, at 49. 
221 Desanctis v. Prichard, 803 A.2d 230, 231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). For a 
discussion of this case, see Hankin, supra note 52, at 323. 
222 Desanctis, 803 A.2d at 231. 
223 Id. at 232 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502). 
224 Paek, supra note 211, at 505. 
225 See Alaska Legislation Allows Courts to Consider Pet Well-Being  
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in proposing and passing similar legislation.226 Tennessee 
law may be evolving in this regard. In one Tennessee case, 
for example, the judge ruled that dogs at issue in one dispute 
should remain in the house and neighborhood where they 
had spent their entire lives, echoing the type of reasoning 
often used in child custody cases.227 The judge appeared to 
be sympathetic to the views of many animal welfare activists 
who urge that custody battles for pets should be “based on . 
. . who has formed a closer bond to the animal, or who can 
provide a better home for it,” 228  instead of focusing on 
property ownership as determined through receipts for 
purchase and veterinary care.229  
Determining ownership of an animal for purposes of 
custody disputes is often difficult. In cases involving married 
parties, community property issues complicate already 
murky applications of traditional property law. While the 
assignment of ownership based on the best interests of the 
                                                 
in Marriage Dissolutions and Pet Protective Orders, THE LINK-LETTER 
(November 2016), at 1, http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/LinkLetter-2016-Novem.pdf. 
226 See, e.g., Patrick Anderson, Bill seeks to give pets a voice in R.I. 
divorce cases + Poll, PROVIDENCE J. (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170228/bill-seeks-to-give-
pets-voice-in-ri-divorce-cases--poll; Illinois Considers Pets’ Welfare in 
Divorce Proceedings, THE LINK-LETTER (July 2017), at 10, 
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LinkLetter-
2017-July.pdf; Christopher Mele, When Couples Divorce, Who Gets to 
Keep the Dog? (Or Cat.), N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/us/divorce-pet-custody-dog-
cat.html?_r=0. 
227 Ann Hartwell Britton, Bones of Contention: Custody of Family Pets, 
20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 1, 15 (2006) (quoting Michael Lollar, 
Who Gets Snoopy? Custody of Pets Can Be a Wrenching Issue in 
Divorce, COM. APPEAL, Jan. 11, 1996, at 1C). 
228 Hankin, supra note 52, at 387. 
229 Britton, supra note 227, at 4 (quoting Ranny Green, ‘Legal Beagle’ 
Offers Problem-Solving Tips, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at H5 
(quoting statements made by Linda Cawley, one the nation’s first and 
pet law experts)). 
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animal could be an appropriate method to resolve custody 
disputes in domestic violence situations, 230  in most 
jurisdictions, the traditional approach to ownership 
determinations is still the law. Accordingly, traditional 
property ownership concepts continue to be the basis for 
educating abuse victims as they consider fleeing from a 
violent home. For example, one informational sheet 
published by The Humane Society of the United States 
(“HSUS”) instructs battered women that they can prove 
ownership of their pets by producing “[a]n animal license, 
proof of vaccinations, or veterinary receipts” in their 
names.231  
 
D. Bailment and Damages for Conversion of Property 
in a Safe Haven Context 
 
 Bailments involving animals raise particularly 
thorny issues at the intersection of the traditional and 
progressive conceptions of animals as property. Bailment is 
the “delivery of personal property by one person (the bailor) 
to another (the bailee) who holds the property for a certain 
purpose, [usually] under an express or implied-in-fact 
contract.”232 A bailment is neither a gift nor a conveyance of 
title; the bailee takes possession of the property, but title and 
                                                 
230 Gentry, supra note 47, at 115 (citing Raymond v. Lachmann, 695 
N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)). Yet, we must carefully avoid 
standards that could result in ownership being assigned to the abuser, 
such as if ownership were based on who had formed the closest bond 
with the animal. 
231 ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116, at A-66. 
232 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Merritt v. 
Nationwide Warehouse Co., 605 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) 
(“A bailment is a delivery of personalty for a particular purpose or on 
mere deposit, on a contract expressed or implied, that after the purpose 
has been fulfilled, it shall be re-delivered to the person who delivered it 
or otherwise dealt with according to his direction or kept until he 
reclaims it.”); 1 TENN. JURIS., Bailments § 2 n.18 (2004) (providing a list 
of Tennessee cases that affirm this definition). 
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the right to recover possession remain with the bailor.233 
Thus, Tennessee law (like the law of other U.S. jurisdictions) 
holds that property delivered by a bailor to a bailee “shall be 
re-delivered to the person who delivered it or otherwise dealt 
with according to his direction or kept until he reclaims 
it.”234 The bailor has a cause of action against the bailee for 
conversion if the bailee “fail[s] or refus[es],” inconsistent 
with the bailment contract, “to return [the property]. . . .”235 
Tennessee also recognizes that while a bailment is 
contractual in nature (centering on an express or implied 
agreement between the bailor and the bailee) a legally valid 
and enforceable contract is not required to create a legally 
valid and enforceable bailment. 236  For instance, a quasi-
contract might suffice, and a bailment may be created by 
operation of law in certain circumstances. 237  There are 
various types of bailment. Of particular importance in 
animal care is a gratuitous bailment for the benefit of the 
bailor, which is in the nature of a caretaking arrangement for 
the property of the bailor in which “the bailee receives no 
compensation.”238  
Animals involved in bailments are typically treated 
the same way inanimate, insentient property is treated, in 
accordance with the traditional conception of animals as 
property.239 Pet owners enter into myriad bailment situations 
concerning their pets (including by, for example, leaving a 
pet at a veterinary hospital for a surgery or boarding a pet at 
a kennel during a vacation). Many of these arrangements are 
bailments for the mutual benefit of the bailor and the bailee, 
since the bailee receives compensation for services that 
                                                 
233 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (9th ed. 2009). 
234 Aegis Investigative Group v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson 
County, 98 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
235 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 239 (2014). 
236 Aegis Investigative Group, 98 S.W.3d at 163. 
237 Id. 
238 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (9th ed. 2009). 
239 FRANCIONE, supra note 74, at 52. 
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include the bailment. 240  Of particular importance to this 
article, a human victim of domestic violence enters into a 
bailment arrangement (a gratuitous bailment for the benefit 
of the bailor) when she asks a safe haven shelter to house 
and care for her pet for a limited amount of time while she is 
in a shelter that admits only humans. The solution we offer 
in Part III of this article works with this property law 
conception. 
Bailments involving animals, like custody battles 
involving animals, raise issues about ownership; bailors are 
typically owners or agents of owners, while bailees often 
want to ascertain the bailor’s ownership before accepting the 
subject property for safekeeping. Significant uncertainty 
exists in this area of the law as applied in this context, as 
revealed by the responses in Ascione’s survey of shelters 
that provided services for the pets of domestic violence 
victims.241 After a brief description of responses he received, 
Ascione concluded that “specific recommendations are not 
possible given the current lack of consensus about how to 
deal with pet ownership issues.”242 The lack of clear legal 
guidance Ascione observed persists and does a disservice to 
both human and nonhuman victims of violence.  
Ascione’s specific findings revealed different levels 
of awareness and various understandings of pet ownership 
questions. One animal shelter in Ascione’s survey indicated 
that ownership only became an issue if pets were not 
reclaimed or would otherwise need long-term 
arrangements.243 Most shelters reported that they informed 
women that they would lose ownership of their pets if they 
failed to reclaim them at the end of the agreed-upon 
sheltering time, many even requiring the women to sign a 
                                                 
240 46 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 4 (1998). 
241 See ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
Proof of ownership of personal property can be tricky. 
242 Id. at 40. 
243 Id. at 38. 
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form acknowledging this possibility. 244  Some shelters 
assumed that the animal became the property of the shelter 
upon entry, which indicates a possible misunderstanding by 
the shelter of the nature of a bailment; while other shelters 
thought that they would have to return the pet to the abuser 
if he came for it.245   
Moreover, shelters surveyed by Ascione were split 
on whether a woman could relinquish a pet when she was a 
co-owner or the abuser was the sole owner of the animal.246 
Among the animal shelters that responded to Ascione’s 
survey, 30% believed that a co-owner could relinquish a pet, 
while 40% believed that she could not.247 Under the law, in 
a cotenancy of either real or personal property, cotenants 
have “unity of possession” under “more than one distinct 
title” so that each cotenant has full title and the right of 
possession, making it so that no cotenant can exclude any 
other cotenant from the property.248 Accordingly, if a pet is 
co-owned by a victim of domestic violence and her abuser, 
neither, alone, can relinquish ownership of the pet. 
Legal ownership is especially important in the safe 
haven sheltering context when a victim and her abuser 
contest pet ownership and a shelter must decide upon a 
course of action. A woman can relinquish a pet or place it in 
a sheltering program if she is the sole legal owner. 249 
However, legal ownership of an animal is not always easily 
discerned, which could have ramifications when a victim of 
violence attempts to remove a pet from an abusive home or 
when the pet is being sheltered.  
Ownership in the safe haven context is a combined 
issue of law and fact that may require judicial resolution. 
                                                 
244 Id. at 36. 
245 Id. at 38–39. 
246 Id. at 38. 
247 Id. 
248 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 1 (2014). 
249 ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116, at 40. 
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Exclusive possession over an extended period of time creates 
a rebuttable presumption of ownership.250 But in a typical 
domestic violence situation, abusers, human victims, and 
pets are living together in a single household. Legal guidance 
is sparse when the animal in question has been in the 
possession of both parties who claim ownership. In a case 
involving a prized show dog that was being shown by the 
defendants with the plaintiff’s permission, an Illinois court 
found that a certificate of registration that listed the 
defendants as co-owners created only a presumption of co-
ownership that was rebutted by the “demeanor of witnesses” 
that suggested that the plaintiff had never intended to 
relinquish sole ownership of the dog when the certificate was 
created.251 Thus, written documents are not a foolproof way 
to establish ownership. A legal determination as to 
ownership could depend instead on other facts and the 
credibility of the parties in asserting them.  
 Current law provides so little guidance in part 
because of the paucity of judicial opinions in this area of the 
law in a safe haven or analogous context. Few Tennessee 
cases have dealt with bailment in an animal abuse situation. 
One noteworthy case, however, is Largin v. Williamson 
County Animal Control Shelter. In Largin, Williamson 
County officials seized animals from the plaintiff’s home as 
part of animal abuse proceedings that the state had initiated 
against her. 252  The plaintiff was eventually convicted of 
animal abuse 253  and subsequently initiated a proceeding 
against the animal shelter when it refused to return the 
animals to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that, by refusing 
to return the animals, the defendant animal shelter 
                                                 
250 Beard v. Mossman, 19 A.2d 850, 851 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1941). 
251 Buczkowicz v. Lubin, 399 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
252 NO. M2005-01255-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2619973, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 12, 2006). 
253 State v. Siliski, 238 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). 
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committed conversion and/or negligent bailment. 254  The 
trial court dismissed the case on a technical matter based on 
a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted,255 because the complaint did not allege that the tort 
was caused by a government employee behaving negligently 
within the scope of his employment as is required under 
Tennessee law. 256  In reviewing the matter, the appellate 
court (like the trial court) never reached the validity or 
enforceability of the bailment itself. Instead, it affirmed the 
lower court’s dismissal based on the procedural 
requirements of Tennessee law.257 
As inadequate and incomplete as property law may 
be in this context, it continues to govern the legal 
relationship between humans and their pets. As a result, 
under current safe haven arrangements, a human domestic 
violence victim (as bailor) who shelters her animal in a safe 
haven program (as bailee) has a legitimate expectation under 
the law that she will recover possession of her animal on 
request. This arrangement exists solely for the benefit and 
subject to the control of the human victim. The health, 
welfare, and overall interests of the nonhuman animal, 
objectively determined, are not accounted for in current 
bailments of this kind. This creates a conundrum for the safe 
haven: even if safe haven shelter or social services 
professionals reasonably believe that an animal is in danger 
of being abused if he or she is returned to the owner, 
bailment law provides that the animal must be returned. This 
legal conclusion troubles us and motivates this article. 
We have determined that public policy and legal 
considerations provide a basis for rethinking the way in 
which bailment relationships between domestic violence 
                                                 
254 Largin, 2006 WL 2619973, at *1. 
255 Id. at *2. 
256 Id. at *4 (citing Gentry v. Cookeville Gen. Hosp., 734 S.W.2d 337, 
339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)). 
257 Largin, 2006 WL 2619973, at *4–5. 
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victims and safe haven shelters are constructed. Documented 
connections between human and animal violence have 
focused attention on the need to include animals in the 
equation as a component and resolution of the family 
violence problem (or at least as a means of mitigating the 
effects of family violence).258 The legal system already has 
reacted to this phenomenon with the inclusion of animals in 
protective orders, an increase in criminal penalties for 
animal abuse, and the adoption of human-animal abuse 
cross-reporting statutes.259 In addition, the law has begun to 
react to the changing nature of the human-pet bond by 
providing for non-economic tort damages for the death of a 
pet.260 Because bailment agreements are contractual, it is 
possible to better incorporate this changing socio-legal 
landscape into bailment relationships between human 
domestic violence victims and safe haven shelters. Part III 
explores this idea under the laws of the State of Tennessee, 
the state in which we are licensed to practice. Analogous 
arguments may be persuasive in other U.S. jurisdictions. 
 
III. Special Bailments as a Solution to the Safe Haven 
Conundrum 
 
A. A Proposal and its Legal Basis 
 
Because bailments are in the nature of contracts, the 
bailor and bailee may create a “special bailment.” While a 
general bailment requires that the property be “redelivered 
upon request,” in a special bailment the “delivery to the 
bailee is upon some condition or term, or stipulation 
affecting and operating upon the redelivery.” 261  If a pet-
                                                 
258 See supra Part I.A.4. 
259 Id. 
260 See supra Part II.C.2. 
261 1 TENN. JURIS., Bailments § 2 (2004); see also Aegis Investigative 
Group v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 98 S.W.3d 159, 
162–63. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added) (“A bailment is a 
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owning human domestic violence victim and a safe haven 
shelter together agree that the victim’s pet will be cared for 
by the shelter for a temporary period and that the shelter will 
return the pet, subject to the fulfillment of a specified term 
or the satisfaction of an express condition, that conditional 
bailment agreement should be enforced if challenged in 
court. 
Exceptions to a court’s enforcement of a special 
bailment agreement of this kind under Tennessee law may 
include contract formation or enforcement defenses or 
public policy considerations. For example, the lack of legal 
capacity of the bailor pet owner (because of minority status 
or sufficiently impaired mental capacity) may render the 
bailment agreement void or voidable. 262  In addition, the 
court may not enforce a safe haven bailment agreement: if 
the bailor pet owner enters into the agreement under legally 
recognized duress or subject to undue influence 263  or is 
parted from her animal as a result of fraud; 264  if the 
                                                 
delivery of personalty for a particular purpose or on mere deposit, on a 
contract expressed or implied, that after the purpose has been fulfilled it 
shall be re-delivered to the person who delivered it or otherwise dealt 
with according to his direction or kept until he reclaims it.”); Merritt v. 
Nationwide Warehouse Co., 605 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) 
(same); Rhodes v. Pioneer Parking Lot, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tenn. 
1973) (same). 
262 See Lowery v. Cate, 64 S.W. 1068, 1070 (Tenn. 1901) (noting that 
infancy is a good defense to a claim of breach of contract). 
263 See Reed v. Allen, C/A NO. 1153, 1988 WL 90185, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Aug. 30, 1988) (describing an application of the duress and undue 
influence claim under Tennessee law). 
264 The effect of fraud on contracts and other transactions in Tennessee 
has been described as follows: 
Fraud vitiates and avoids all human transactions, from 
the solemn judgment of a court to a private contract. It 
is as odious and as fatal in a court of law as in a court 
of equity. It is a thing indefinable by any fixed and 
arbitrary definition. In its multiform phases and subtle 
shapes, it baffles definition. It is said, indeed, that it is 
part of the equity doctrine of fraud not to define it, lest 
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agreement is found to be unconscionable;265 or if the conduct 
between the parties gives rise to a valid claim of estoppel.266 
In most cases, the availability of these formation and 
enforcement defenses can be limited by effective controls on 
the actions taken by the bailor and bailee.  
Valid and binding contracts typically are enforced in 
Tennessee consistent with public policy. 
 
Unless a private contract tends to harm the 
public good, public interest, or public 
welfare, or to conflict with the constitution, 
laws, or judicial decisions of Tennessee, it 
                                                 
the craft of men should find ways of committing fraud 
which might evade such a definition. In its most 
general sense, it embraces all “acts, omissions, or 
concealments which involve a breach of legal and 
equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, and 
are injurious to another, or by which an undue and 
unconscientious advantage is taken of another.” A 
judicial proceeding in rem, while generally binding 
upon all persons, is no more free from the fatal taint of 
fraud than a proceeding in personam, or an individual 
contract. When once shown to exist, it poisons alike 
the contract of the citizen, the treaty of the diplomat, 
and the solemn judgment of the court. 
Smith v. Harrison, 49 Tenn. 230, 242–43 (Tenn. 1871) (internal citation 
omitted). 
265 In our view, the defense of unconscionability is unlikely to be raised 
(or, if raised, survive a motion for summary judgment) in a court action 
involving safe haven bailment agreement, since the bargain between the 
pet owner and the shelter is not likely to be so one-sidedly favorable to 
the shelter—or oppressive to the pet owner—that a court could find the 
agreement unconscionable. See Haun v. King, 690 S.W.2d 869, 872 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (describing, in similar terms, the 
unconscionability defense in Tennessee) (citing Hume v. United States, 
132 U.S. 406 (1889); Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 
1977)). 
266 See Callahan v. Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1954) (setting forth the elements of an equitable estoppel claim) (citing 
19 AM. JUR. Estoppel § 42). 
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does not violate public policy. The reverse is 
also true: A contract with a tendency to injure 
the public violates public policy.267 
 
In determining the sources of Tennessee public policy, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court has stated 
 
[p]ublic policy in Tennessee “is to be found 
in its constitution, statutes, judicial decisions 
and applicable rules of common law.” 
Although the determination of public policy 
is primarily a function of the legislature, the 
judiciary may determine public policy in the 
absence of any constitutional or statutory 
declaration.268 
 
Public policy in Tennessee supports the use of a 
special bailment as a solution to the safe haven conundrum. 
Property rights are strong in Tennessee, but Tennessee law 
has evolved to incorporate animal welfare into legal 
questions involving pets in domestic violence situations. 
Specifically, the Tennessee constitution provides “[t]hat no 
man shall be . . . deprived of his . . . property, but by the 
judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”269 However, 
the Tennessee General Assembly and Tennessee courts have 
provided that human animal owners may be deprived of their 
animals under certain circumstances. For example, human 
subjects of protective orders in Tennessee may be 
                                                 
267 Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 
1991) (internal citations omitted) (citing Home Beneficial Ass’n v. 
White, 177 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tenn. 1944); Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. 
Lawson, 229 S.W. 741, 743 (1921); Holt v. Holt, 751 S.W.2d 426, 428 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)). 
268  Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Tenn. 1998) (internal 
citations omitted) (quoting Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 112 n.17 
(Tenn. 1975)). 
269 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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dispossessed of some or all of their ownership rights in a 
family pet. 270  Moreover, a person convicted under 
Tennessee’s animal cruelty statutes may be required by the 
court to forfeit possession and ownership of the subject 
animal.271 In these cases, the court also “may prohibit the 
person convicted from having custody of other animals for 
any period of time the court determines to be reasonable, or 
impose any other reasonable restrictions on the person's 
custody of animals as necessary for the protection of the 
animals.” 272  In State v. Webb, the Tennessee Court of 
Criminal Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the 
reasonableness of the trial court’s imposition of a ten-year 
prohibition on ownership of any animals by the defendant, a 
person convicted of animal cruelty. 273  Moreover, as the 
background provided in Parts I and II of this article amply 
shows, Tennessee law is evolving to incorporate animal 
welfare concerns in a variety of contexts—especially those 
involving pets, including pets in domestic violence 
situations.274 
Accordingly, we propose that safe haven shelters 
enter into written bailment agreements 275  that expressly 
                                                 
270 TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-3-606(a)(9) (2016). 
271 Id. §§ 39-14-202(e), -212(e) (2016). 
272 Id. § 39-14-202(e) (2016); see also id. § 39-14-212(e) (2016) (“The 
court may prohibit the defendant from having custody of other animals 
for any period of time the court determines to be reasonable, or impose 
any other reasonable restrictions on the person's custody of animals as is 
necessary for the protection of the animals.”). 
273 130 S.W.3d 799, 838–39 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). 
274 See, e.g., supra notes 207 & 208 and accompanying text. 
275 Many safe haven shelters already use written agreements to settle 
ownership of the pets during sheltering. In Francione’s survey, for 
example, fourteen safe haven shelters (66.7% of the survey) had a policy 
providing that owners of sheltered pets “would lose custody or 
ownership of their pets if they failed to retrieve [them].” See ASCIONE, 
SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116. At six of the shelters (30% of survey), 
“ownership was formally transferred to the animal welfare agency” upon 
the commencement of sheltering, while at three other shelters (15% of 
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condition the return of pets to their owners on an objective 
determination that the pet is not returning to a household that 
puts the pet at significant risk of physical, mental, or 
emotional harm. 276  That objective determination may be 
made by the shelter itself or by an independent third party 
(acting in the nature of “animal protective services” or a 
guardian ad litem) and, in either case, should be based on 
information supplied to it in good faith by or on behalf of the 
owner in accordance with an established protocol. Because 
shelter personnel may be considered to be interested parties 
in the decision-making process (perhaps having formed their 
own human-animal bonds with the pets under their care), it 
is preferable that an independent third party be designated to 
make the risk determination. The decision maker, the timing 
and nature of notices between the parties, the standard 
governing the decision, the evidentiary burdens, and the rest 
of the decision-making process should be delineated 
expressly in the written bailment agreement. The shelter 
should determine its own release policy.277 Existing forms of 
bailment used in this context can be modified to include a 
condition of this kind. 
                                                 
survey), pets were re-licensed so as to no longer appear in the woman’s 
name. Id. at 37–38.  
276  The condition is intended to be a tailored analog to court 
determinations of the “best interests of the child” in legal proceedings 
involving child welfare.  See generally CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION 
GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2016), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/best_interest.pdf (summarizing 
the standard for “best interests” and its definition and use in various 
states); Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, Your Client's 
Rights (noting that a parent may lose rights to a child “involuntarily if 
the Judge of a Chancery, Circuit or Juvenile Court finds there are legal 
grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best 
interest.”) (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
277  To help in creating that policy, we recommend reviewing and 
considering the general information provided id. at 36–40 (describing the 
results of Ascione’s study pertaining to owner knowledge of release 
policies and pet ownership issues upon release). 
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The procedure employed by safe haven shelters to 
effectuate the special bailment should be carefully designed 
and executed in a manner that best ensures the agreement 
will be determined to be valid and enforceable if challenged. 
Accordingly, we recommend that the safe haven shelter, at a 
minimum, engage in the following steps in entering into and 
exercising its rights under the bailment agreement: 
• The safe haven shelter should ensure that the pet 
owner who signs the agreement has the legal capacity 
to enter into a contract. She must be of the requisite 
age and have the requisite mental competence under 
applicable state law in order for a court to determine 
her to have the requisite legal capacity. 278  Obtain 
documentary proof, if it is available or can be 
obtained. 
• Similarly, shelter personnel should ensure that the 
pet owner does not feel threatened or intimidated into 
signing the agreement by any words spoken or 
actions taken directly or indirectly by the safe haven 
shelter or any intermediary (e.g., a social worker 
working with the pet owner). 
                                                 
278See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(2) (1981) 
(stating that a “natural person” has “full legal capacity to incur 
contractual duties” unless she is: “under guardianship,” an “infant,” 
“mentally ill or defective,” or “intoxicated”); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 31 
(“It is essential that the parties to a contract have the capacity to contract. 
. . . The capacity to contract involves a person’s inability to understand 
the terms of an agreement, and not his actual understanding.”); 17 C.J.S. 
Contracts § 175 (“The test of mental capacity to contract is whether the 
person in question possesses sufficient mind to understand, in a 
reasonable manner, the nature, extent, character, and effect of the act or 
transaction . . . . [T]o invalidate his contract . . . it is sufficient to show 
that he or she was mentally incompetent to deal with the particular 
contract in issue.”); Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1991) (stating that “[n]o published Tennessee authority is found 
which defines degree of mental capacity required to invalidate a 
contract,” but quoting with approval the above language from 17 C.J.S. 
Contracts § 133(1)(e) (now 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 175)). 
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• The pet owner and representatives of the shelter 
should discuss and document all facts about violence 
to the pet, threats made against the pet, violent 
behavior directed toward the pet, in addition to basic 
health and care information. 
• Shelter personnel should read and describe the 
standards associated with release of the pet to the 
owner.279 Clarify that the animal may not be returned 
to the owner under the circumstances outlined in the 
agreement and that the owner surrenders ownership 
of the pet to the shelter under those circumstances. 
Offer standard examples of situations that allow for 
return of a pet to its owner and of situations that do 
not allow for return. 
These steps (and, as necessary or desired, others specific 
to the shelter) should be set forth in a written protocol 
that is used by the shelter each time it enters into a safe 
haven agreement with a pet owner. Other steps specific 
to the pet owner and related circumstances may be 
added to the protocol in discrete cases. Any additions of 
this kind should be documented in writing and included 
with the file for the resulting agreement. 
 
B. Possible Extralegal Concerns with the Proposal 
 
We readily acknowledge that the proposal we outline 
in Part III.A is not without drawbacks. Paramount among 
them are the effects of the agreement (and the execution of 
its terms and provisions) on the mental and emotional state 
of the human pet owner—a victim of domestic violence. In 
addition, our proposal may raise personal and professional 
concerns for the social workers serving these domestic 
                                                 
279 Of course, the shelter should review all of the terms of the bailment 
with the pet owner to ensure that she understands all aspects of the 
arrangement. 
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violence victims. This section briefly addresses these two 
anticipated critiques of our proposal. 
Based on the touching human-pet bond described 
supra Part I, one could argue that it is in the human victim’s 
best interests to retain full ownership of—and complete 
control over the residence of—her pet. Often, the pet is the 
only source of unconditional love and constancy that the 
woman has.280 Furthermore, research on domestic violence 
has revealed that leaving a domestic violence situation is a 
process, meaning that these human victims rarely make a 
sudden and complete break from their abusers. In a study 
conducted in 1983, for example, 50% of the victims who fled 
to a shelter returned to their abusers.281 Instead of seeing this 
return as a “failure[],” however, the authors of the study cast 
the stay at the shelter as “part of the process of gaining 
independence.” 282  These women return to their violent 
homes with new insights and knowledge, so that the time at 
the shelter was in fact quite useful.283 One could therefore 
argue that it would be detrimental for these women to lose 
their pets in this situation. Perhaps some women would 
refuse to come to the shelter at all, denying themselves a 
chance to begin the process of growth and understanding that 
could ultimately help them leave their abusive situations. 
Even when safe havens and abuse victims create valid 
special bailment agreements, a victim could experience a 
host of unhealthy reactions if the situation were to develop 
so that the victim had to relinquish her pet. These unhealthy 
reactions could include an increased sense of isolation, anger 
toward the safe haven system, or distrust of the social 
workers tasked with helping these abuse victims. For these 
                                                 
280 Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 113. 
281 Kathleen J. Ferraro & John M. Johnson, How Women Experience 
Battering: The Process of Victimization, 30 SOC. PROBS. 325, 336 
(1983). 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
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and other reasons, we appreciate that a special bailment 
might not be the best option for every abuse victim and that 
the invocation of the special bailment would need to be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. 
The process suggested in our proposal also may put 
additional pressure on social workers working with victims 
of family violence and create tensions with their obligation 
of confidentiality to their clients. Clinical social workers 
typically have stressful jobs.284 Studies find that the stress 
social workers suffer may subject them to a significant risk 
of secondary post-traumatic stress disorder.285  
Social workers who provide services for domestic 
violence victims may experience unique types of stress, 
including vicarious traumatization. 286  The unhealthy 
physical and emotional reaction to the stresses of clinical 
social work and related fields—which is associated with 
secondary post-traumatic stress disorder and vicarious 
traumatization—has also been termed “compassion 
fatigue.”287 This term was first used to describe “burnout in 
                                                 
284 See generally CHARLES R. FIGLEY & ROBERT G. ROOP, COMPASSION 
FATIGUE IN THE ANIMAL-CARE COMMUNITY 2 (2006) (describing how 
social workers and workers in the animal-care community often engage 
with their clients “at the cost of [their] own care”); NAT’L ASSOC. OF 
SOC. WORKERS, STRESS AT WORK: HOW DO SOCIAL WORKERS COPE? 
(2008), http://workforce.socialworkers.org/whatsnew/stress.pdf; 
Stephanie Baird & Sharon Rae Jenkins, Vicarious Traumatization, 
Secondary Traumatic Stress, and Burnout in Sexual Assault and 
Domestic Violence Agency Staff in Violence and Victims, 18 VIOLENCE 
& VICTIMS 1, 71-86 (16) (2003) (study investigating occupational 
hazards of therapy with trauma sexual abuse victims).  
285 See, e.g., Brian E. Bride, Prevalence of Secondary Traumatic Stress 
among Social Workers, 52 SOCIAL WORK 63 (2007); Shantih E. 
Clemans, Understanding Vicarious Traumatization - Strategies for 
Social Workers, 4 SOC. WORK TODAY 13 (2004) (internal citations 
omitted). 
286 Clemans, supra note 285, at 13. 
287 FIGLEY & ROOP, supra note 284, at 11. 
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nurses exposed to traumatic work-related experiences”288 
but has now also been applied to doctors, social workers, 
veterinarians, and animal shelter workers. Their work 
requires these professionals “to feel the emotional needs and 
experiences” of their clients (human or animal), but this 
empathic response makes the caregiver susceptible to 
trauma. 289  Symptoms of compassion fatigue include “[a] 
sense of powerlessness,” “fear,” “numbness,” and the feeling 
of being on “[a]n emotional roller coaster.”290  
Compassion fatigue is the result of “prolonged 
exposure to suffering” coupled with “traumatic memories” 
of “unresolved conflicts and distress” related to the suffering 
of clients.291 A study of animal-care workers conducted by 
the HSUS between 2003 and 2004 found that about 68% of 
animal shelter workers surveyed were at “high” or 
“extremely high” risk of developing compassion fatigue, 
which could manifest itself through symptoms such as self-
doubt, numbness, fear, depression, hyper-vigilance, and 
sleep disturbances.292 Similarly, a 2008 survey conducted by 
the National Association of Social Workers indicates that 
25% of social workers in child welfare/family practices 
“experience sleep disorders,” 37% report psychological 
problems, and 65% suffer from fatigue. 293  Undoubtedly, 
social work and related fields produce highly stressful work 
environments. Accordingly, when reasonable, efforts should 
be made to avoid creating new policies that would further 
burden these workers.  
                                                 
288 Id. at 22 (citing C. Joinson, Coping with Compassion Fatigue, 22 
NURSING 116, 116-22 (1992)). 
289 FIGLEY & ROOP, supra note 284, at 12. 
290 Id. at 5. 
291 Id. at 13. 
292 Id. at 23, 48. The study also noted that this percentage of at-risk 
animal shelter workers (about 68%) was much higher than the 
percentage of at-risk veterinarians (about 30%), presumably because 
there is more trauma present in animal shelters. Id. at 53.  
293 NAT’L ASSOC. SOC. WORKERS, supra note 284, at 5. 
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Moreover, social workers, like psychologists and 
attorneys, have a professional obligation to keep client 
relations and communications confidential absent consent 
from the client or other compelling professional reasons.294 
Tennessee law treats this confidential information as 
privileged to the same extent that psychologist-patient and 
attorney-client confidences are privileged. 295  In all 
likelihood, a pet owner who chooses to place her pet in safe 
haven under our proposed form of special bailment would 
need to give consent to her social worker to supply necessary 
information to the person charged with determining whether 
the owner’s pet can be returned to her under the terms of the 
bailment agreement (the shelter or the third-party decision 
maker).296 Under applicable ethical rules governing social 
workers, this requires that the social worker inform the 
client, “to the extent possible, about the disclosure of 
confidential information and the potential consequences, 
when feasible before the disclosure is made.”297 Workers 
must offer this information in addition to general counseling 
about “the nature of confidentiality and limitations of 
clients’ right to confidentiality.”298 Although there is some 
precedent in the cross-reporting context for exempting 
                                                 
294  NAT’L ASSOC. SOC. WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS § 1.07 (1996) 
[hereinafter NASW CODE OF ETHICS]. 
295 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-105 (providing for attorney-client 
privilege), 63-11-213 (providing for psychologist-patient privilege) & 
63-23-109 (providing for social worker-client privilege); Kirchner v. 
Mitsui & Co., 184 F.R.D. 124, 126 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).  
296  The express exception allowing for disclosure of confidential 
information does not strictly apply here, since the “serious, foreseeable, 
and imminent harm” anticipated under the conditional bailment is not “to 
a client or other identifiable person,” but rather to a pet. See NASW 
CODE OF ETHICS § 1.07(c) (“The general expectation that social workers 
will keep information confidential does not apply when disclosure is 
necessary to prevent serious, foreseeable, and imminent harm to a client 
or other identifiable person.”). 
297 Id. § 1.07(d). 
298 Id. § 1.07(e). 
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certain communications from these confidentiality 
strictures,299 the management of confidential information is 
already complicated and burdensome for social workers, and 
a special bailment like that proposed here would add to that 
complexity and burden. 
 
C.  Potential Extralegal Benefits of the Proposal 
 
Yet, the proposal we make in Part III.A also may 
assist social workers and their clients in dealing with the 
difficult circumstances and decisions emanating from 
domestic violence. For example, the existence of a special 
bailment may provide the social worker with a means of 
helping the client to relieve additional stress associated 
with providing care to a pet as he or she attempts to better 
care for herself and may provide the social worker with 
healthy additional leverage in communications with client 
victims of domestic violence. This section addresses these 
two potential benefits. 
First, the removal of the animal victim from the cycle 
of violence could reduce the emotional trauma for both 
human and non-human victims. Domestic violence victims 
experience an emotional roller coaster that is similar in 
origin and manifestation to the phenomenon known as 
compassion fatigue, as described above in Part III.B. Several 
studies, for example, have described the “climate of fear” 
                                                 
299  See, e.g., Phil Arkow, Confidentiality Concerns and Solutions in 
Cross-Reporting Animal Abuse and Other Forms of Family Violence, 
NATIONAL LINK COALITION (June 13, 2017) (copy on file with author); 
Kevin S. Doyle & Maureen J. Walls-McKay, Confidentiality in 
Question: The Erosion of the Cornerstone of Counseling?, VISTAS 
ONLINE (2017), https://www.counseling.org/knowledge-center/vistas/ 
by-year2/vistas-2017/docs/default-source/vistas/confidentiality-in-
question; Kathryn S. Krase, Social Workers as Mandated Reporters: 
Conflicted Over Confidentiality? Part IV, THE NEW SOCIAL WORKER, 
http://www.socialworker.com/feature-articles/practice/social-workers-
as-mandated-reporters%3A/ (last visited August 1, 2017). 
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experienced by the victims of violence.300 One study found 
that women who chose to go to a shelter were actually more 
fearful than their counterparts who were not at shelters.301 
Women who reach out for help—the sort of women who 
shelter their pets while they themselves are in a shelter—are 
in a state of extreme fear. Battered women have been 
described as being in “a numbed shock,” while they may also 
experience a wide and varying range of emotions ranging 
from happiness and excitement to anger and fear.302 These 
emotional reactions raise questions about the ability of these 
human victims to care for their pets and may suggest that, at 
least in certain circumstances, the separation of human and 
pet could help break the cycle of fear and numbness or 
otherwise provide some emotional relief.      
 Similarly, the special bailment agreement could 
provide healthy leverage that hastens the human victim 
along the path of emotional evolution that will ultimately 
compel the victim to leave the violent situation. Before 
victims become willing to sever a violent relationship, they 
must move from rationalization of the violence—a stage 
where the victims view the violence as “normal, acceptable, 
or at least justifiable”—to victimization, a stage where “a 
variety of catalysts” have forced the victim to “redefin[e] 
abuse” and no longer regard the abuse as acceptable.303 The 
catalysts that lead a victim to stop rationalizing the violence 
include: “a [sudden] change in the level of violence[,] . . . a 
change in resources [for the victim,] . . . a change in the 
relationship [with the batterer,] . . . [the onset of] despair[,] . 
. . [an increase in the public nature of the violence,] . . . and 
                                                 
300  Alfred DeMaris & Steven Swinford, Female Victims of Spousal 
Violence: Factors Influencing Their Level of Fearfulness, 45 FAM. REL. 
98, 98 (1996). 
301 Id. at 103. 
302 Ferraro & Johnson, supra note 281, at 334–35. 
303 Id. at 328, 331. 
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[being confronted with] external definitions of the violent 
relationship.”304  
 The possible removal of a pet could trigger several 
of these dimensions of the victimization stage. One obvious 
example would be with respect to “the interjection of 
external definitions of abuse.” 305  Ferraro and Johnson 
describe how victims react positively to “genuine concern” 
shown to them by others. 306  This reasoning could be 
extended to a situation that involves the potential removal of 
the pet. The removal of the pet would highlight the level of 
concern that is felt by outside observers of the situation, 
which in turn might alter the paradigm in which the human 
victim views the violence. Similarly, despite a lack of 
“systematic research,” researchers emphasize that a child’s 
desire to leave an abusive situation has a dramatic impact 
upon a mother in her contemplation of leaving a violent 
home. 307  Although pets cannot vocalize desires to leave 
abusive circumstances, the forced relinquishment of the pet 
could be analogous to a child’s request not to return to a 
violent home.  
 Women often are propelled to act when they reach a 
point of despair and lose all hope that a situation will 
improve.308  Observers note that the victim must hit rock 
bottom before she will leave a domestic violence 
situation.309 The possible or actual relinquishment of a pet 
could push a woman closer to the realization that she herself 
is a victim and that her situation will not improve unless she 
removes herself from the violent household. Specifically, a 
social worker could use the special bailment agreement as a 
tool in educating a domestic violence victim to the danger of 
                                                 
304 Id. at 331. 
305 Id. at 332. 
306 Id. at 333. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. at 332. 
309 Id. 
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returning herself, as well as any dependent children or 
nonhuman animals, to a violent household. Many social 
workers express frustration that they cannot adequately 
portray to domestic violence victims the risks associated 
with a return to the very household in which they 
experienced violence. 310  The assessment and 
communication of potential harm to both children and pets—
as well as potential harm to the victim herself—may help a 
victim of domestic violence in assessing the merits and risks 
of returning to a living situation in which violence can be 
expected.  
To confirm what we earlier stated, we appreciate that 
our special bailment proposal is not an airtight solution or 
panacea for all of the problems associated with animal abuse 
and domestic violence in a safe haven setting. Nonetheless, 
we believe that implementation of our proposal could be 
another way to help “move the ball down the field.” If save 
haven shelters and social workers were given the tools and 
ability to actively and realistically consider special bailments 
as an option to implement on a case-by-case basis, the mere 
act of thinking through the utility and appropriateness of the 
bailment alternative could, itself, have a positive impact on 
specific cases and on the overall state of human and animal 
welfare. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The issues involved in family violence situations are 
multifaceted. As we learn more about them and begin to 
work at resolving them, additional issues present themselves 
for resolution. In the past twenty years or so, a number of 
these emerging issues have arisen out of our increasing 
awareness of the link between animal violence and human 
                                                 
310See, e.g., HSUS, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 102, at 6 (acknowledging 
that a woman’s choice to return to an abusive home is “frustrating” to 
shelter staff). 
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violence in the home. As humans have developed closer, 
family-like relationships with their pets, these animals have 
been unmistakably and unwittingly brought into the cycle of 
family violence. Among other things, we now know that all 
of these living, sentient beings are at risk of harm as 
dependents or cohabitants of a perpetrator of domestic 
violence. 
Both the social service system and the law have 
responded to changes in the social and moral conception of 
animals and their role in family violence. The development 
and operation of safe haven programs for the pets of 
domestic violence victims who are transitioning temporarily 
to shelter life is one of those responses. Overall, the 
installation of safe haven shelters for pets in these 
circumstances has been a positive development. However, 
the potential that a domestic violence victim will reclaim her 
pet and return the pet to a violent household highlights a 
shortcoming in the social services system’s response to 
family violence: nonhuman animal family members are left 
without advocates in the process. Although domestic 
violence victims and their children are assisted and protected 
by specialized counselors, the pets in these households 
continue to be treated not as family members but rather as 
inanimate, insentient property under the control of an owner. 
While this has been the historic legal conception of pets, law 
has begun to acknowledge that this conception is outdated 
and incomplete. 
We suggest that practices, in addition to positive law, 
need to evolve further to protect pets involved in family 
violence situations and disputes. In particular, we propose 
that safe haven shelters use a conditional bailment when they 
take in and care for the pets of domestic violence victims. 
This bailment would prevent return of the pet to its owner if 
the pet would be at significant risk of physical, mental, or 
emotional harm. Through the condition and the essential 
related procedures, animals that have witnessed or been 
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victims of domestic violence receive some protection—
protection at a level commensurate with their position as 
nonhuman family members.
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